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PROFILE  OF  THE  THIRD  WORLD 
THREE  QUARTERS  OF  THE  WORLD'S  POPULATION  LIVES  IN 
COUNTRIES  WHOSE  LEVEL  OF  MATERIAL  AND  SOCIAL  WELL-
BEING  FALLS  FAR  SHORT  OF  THAT  ENJOYED  BY  THE 
INDUSTRIALISED  NATIONS.  THESE  COUNTRIES  ARE 
VARIOUSLY  DESCRIBED  AS  THE  "DEVELOPING"  OR  "LESS 
DEVELOPED"  GROUP  OF  NATIONS.  THEY  ARE  SAID  TO 
BELONG  TO  THE  "THIRD  WORLD"  OR  THE  "SOUTH"  OF  THE 
PLANET  (AS  DISTINCT  FROM  THE  INDUSTRIALISED  "NORTH"). 
TOGETHER  THEY  PRESENT  A VAST  MOSAIC  PATTERN  OF 
VARYING  DEGREES  OF  UNDERDEVELOPMENT.  AS  THEY  ADVANCE 
AT  VERY  DIFFERENT  SPEEDS  DOWN  THE  DEVELOPMENT  ROAD, 
THE  ECONOMIC  SITUATIONS  OF  INDIVIDUAL  THIRD  WORLD 
COUNTRIES  ARE  BECOMING  INCREASINGLY  DISPARATE. 
IN  PARTICULAR,  THE  GAP  IS  WIDENING  FAST  BETWEEN  THE 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  WHICH  HAVE  PASSED  THE  POINT  OF 
ECONOMIC  TAKE-OFF  AND  CAN  NOW  PRODUCE  CERTAIN 
MANUFACTURED  GOODS  MORE  COMPETITIVELY  THAN  THE 
ADVANCED  NATIONS  AND  THE  POOREST  MEMBERS  OF  THE  THIRD 
WORLD,  WHERE  CLOSE  ON  ONE  BILLION  PEOPLE  ARE  STILL 
UNDERFED.  SOME  INDUSTRIALISED  NATIONS  FEEL  THE 
NEWLY  INDUSTRIALISING  COUNTRIES  (NIC's)  OR  CERTAIN 
ARAB  MEMBERS  OF  THE  ORGANISATION  OF  PETROLEUM 
EXPORTING  COUNTRIES  (OPEC)  SHOULD  NO  LONGER  BE 
CONSIDERED  AS  PART  OF  THE  DEVELOPING  WORLD.  THE 
THIRD  WORLD  COUNTRIES  THINK  OTHERWISE.  DESPITE  THEIR 
DISPARITIES,  THEY  CONSIDER  THEMSELVES  AS  SHARING  THE 
SAME  UNEQUAL  RELATIONSHIP  WITH  THE  ADVANCED  WORLD  OF 
THE  NORTH  OF  THE  PLANET.  THEY  SEEK  A MORE  BALANCED 
WORLD  ECONOMIC  SYSTEM.  FOR  THEM,  DIFFERENCES  IN 
THEIR  INDIVIDUAL  SITUATIONS  ARE  ONLY  NORMAL  IN  A 
GROUPING  THAT  COVERS  NEARLY  120  COUNTRIES  SUBJECT 
TO  VARYING  ECONOMIC,  GEOGRAPHIC,  CLIMATIC,  SOCIAL 
AND  CULTURAL  FACTORS. - 2  -
THIS  CHAPTER  ENDEVOURS  TO  DRAW  THE  PROFILE  OF  THE 
THIRD  WORLD  AND  ITS  COMPONENT  PARTS  :  THEIR  SIMI-
LARITIES  AND  THEIR  DIFFERENCES.  IT  SHOWS  THE  NEED 
TO  DEVISE  WITHIN  THE  OVERALL  BI-POLAR  NORTH-SOUTH 
FRAMEWORK  TO  WHICH  THE  THIRD  WORLD  REMAINS 
ATTACHED  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGIES  MORE  ATTUNED  TO 
DIFFERENT  REGIONS  AND  DIFFERENT  COUNTRIES. - 3  -
The  North-South  Gap ••• 
Despite  their increasing diversity,  the  nations of  the 
world  can still be put into two  broad  categories  :  developed 
and  developing.  The  contrast  between  the  industrialised 
countries,  generally  located  in  the  temperate  zones of 
the  Northern  hemisphere,  and  the  poorer  countries 
situated  in  the  sub-tropical  and  tropical  regions  to  the 
south  remains  the  main  justification for  considering 
the challenge of development  in  a  North-South  context. 
The  North,  including  the  eastern countries,  accounts 
for  25%  of  the world's  population  but  80%  of  its 
income.  The  industrialised countries control  the 
world  trading  and  payments  systems.  They  are also 
largely  responsible  for  the  production  system which 
still condemns  many  Third  World  nations  to  the  role 
of  exporters of untreated  primary products.  These 
structures were  put  in place  when  most  developing 
countries were still under  colonial domination. 
Although  they  have  subsequently gained  their political 
independence,  they  are still (albeit  to very different 
degrees)  in  a  state of  economic  bondage. 
A look  at basic development  or  economic  indicators 
confirms  the persistence of  a  North-South  gap.  Taken 
as  a  whole,the  average  per  capita  income  of  the 
Third  World  is still about  800  Dollars  a  year,  only  8% 
of  the  average  level  in  the  industrialised countries. 
Adult  literacy and  life expectancy  levels  are 
considerably  lower  than  in  the  advanced  nations 
(see  Table  I).  Fewer  than  50%  of  the  population of 
developing  countries  (only  an  estimated  29%  in  the 
poorest  among  them)  have  access  to  safe drinking 
water  compared  with  the virtual totality of  the 
population of  the  North. TABLE  I 
SELECTED  BASIC  INDICATORS 
GNP  ~r capita 
Average  Export  Life 
annual  dependence  Adult  expectancy 
growth  on  primary  Population  literacy  at birth 
IX>llars  (percent)  products  per  (percent)  (years) 
1980  196o-80  (%)  IX>ctor  1977  1980 
low-income  economies  260  1.2  56  5  810  50  57 
Olina and  India  270  ..  47  2  130  54  59 
other low-incane  230  1.0  71  19  460  34  48 
1-,-----------------------------·-----------------!------------------- ----------- I 
Middle-income economies  1,400  3.8  26  5  840  65  60 
Oil exporters  11160  3.3  19  8 020  57  56 
Oil  importers  1,580  4.1  30  4 010  73  63 
-----------------------------------~-------- -------------------------·-
High-income oil exporters  12,630  6.3  99  1  380  25  57  ~  ----- --------------------f------------!-------------------------- --------- ----------
Non-market  industrial 
economies  4,640  4.2  37  340  100  71 
--------------------------------f-----------!--------------------------r-------------------. 
Industrial market 
economies  10,320  3.6  25  620  99  74 
Ireland  4,880  3. 1  43  830  98  73 
Italy  6,480  3.6  17  490  98  73 
United Kingdom  7,920  2.2  23  750  99  73 
Netherlands  11,470  3.2  46  580  99  75 
France  11,730  3.9  25  610  99  74 
Belgium  12,180  3.8  23  440  99  73 
Denmark  12,950  3.3  45  510  99  75 
Germany  Fed.  Rep.  13,590  3.3  13  490  99  73 
Source  \\brld Bank,  \'lorld  Developnent  Report  1982. - 5  -
•••  and  the  South-South  Gae 
Yet  the gulf  between  North  and  South  should  not  be 
overdrawn;  another  gap,  this  time  a  South-South  one, 
is widening.  This  is essentially due  to  two  phenomena 
- the concentration of vast  financial  resources  in  a 
small  number  of  Arab oil exporting  nations  and  the 
emergence  of  another  small  group of countries,  which 
are  on  the  threshold of  industrialisation,  the  Newly 
Industrialising Countries  (NIC's).  The  experience  of 
the  Arab oil exporters,  whose  wealth  per  capita now 
exceeds  that of  the  majority of  industrialised states, 
is a  unique  one. 
They  represent only  a  fraction of  the  Third  World 
population  :  Libya,  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait  and  the 
United  Arab  Emirates  have  14  million  inhabitants 
between  them.  Moreover,  apart  from  their  high  per 
capita  income  the other  basic  indicators of  these 
countries  (life expectancy,  literacy levels,excessive 
dependence  on  raw  materials)  confirm their  place' 
among ·the  less  advanced  nations. 
Much  more  relevant  in  development  terms  is  the 
widening  gap  between  more  successful Third  World 
nations,  symbolised  by  the NIC's,  and  a  core  group 
of  the  poorest countries  seemingly  held  fast  in  the 
permanent grip of poverty  and  backwardness.  The  NIC's, 
the  early starters  in  the development  process,  already 
play  a  significant role  in  the  worldwide  production of 
and  trade  in manufactured  goods.  They  are  being 
followed  - at a  considerable distance  - by  some  other 
so-called  "middle  income"  members  of  the  Third  World. 
As  of  198.1,  according  to  UNCTAD  estimates,  no  fewer  than 
30  developing countries  posessed  manufacturing  sectors 
whose  annual  exports  exceeded  $100 million.  Table  II 
shows  how,  even  in  a  relatively short  space of  time,  the 
gap  between  the  poorest  nations  and  the  NIC's  is  increasing, 
while  the latter,  in spite of  a  higher  population growth, 
still keep  pace  in  terms  of  GNP  per  head  with  industrialised 
nations  such  as  the  members of  the  European  Community. -
TABLE  II 
Bhutan 
Chad 
B'mgladesh 
Ethiopia 
Mali 
Burundi 
Rwanda 
Upper  Volta 
AVERAGE 
S.  Korea 
Brazil 
Hong kong 
Singapore 
AVERAGE 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
United  Kingdom 
Netherlands 
France 
Belg  iurn/Lux. 
Denmark 
Germany 
EEC  AVERAGE 
- 6  -
GNP  per capita  1977-1980 
(selected countries) 
LLDC
1s, NIC
1s  &  EOC 
In US  Ibllar  s 
1977  1980 
80  80 
130  120 
110  130 
110  140 
110  190 
130  200 
130  200 
130  210 
116  159 
--- ---
820  1.520 
1.360  2.050 
2.590  4.240 
2.880  4.430 
1.912  3.060 
----- ===== 
2.810  4.380 
2.880  4.880 
3.440  6.480 
4.420  7.920 
7.150  11.470 
7.290  11.730 
7.590  12.180 
8.040  12.950 
8.160  13.590 
5.753  9.507 
---- ----
% 
rise 
0% 
- 8% 
18% 
27% 
73% 
54% 
54% 
62% 
35% 
=== 
85% 
51% 
64% 
54% 
64% 
== 
56% 
69% 
88% 
79% 
60% 
61% 
60% 
61% 
67% 
67% 
---
Source  WOrld  Bank,  WOrld  Development  Report  (various issues). - 7  -
Although  the majority of developing  countries fall 
between  the  extremes  of  the  least developed  nations 
on  the one  hand  and  the  NIC's  on  the other,  the  fact 
that  a  certain polarisation is occuring  is of capital 
importance  for  North-South  relations  and  for  world 
development  strategies for  the rest of this century. 
The  issues  involved  are dealt with  in detail  in  the 
subsequent  sectibns of  this document.  The 
fundamental  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  this trend  is 
that many developing  countries are  not well  enough 
endowed  with  resources  - natural,  human  or  financial  -
to benefit  from  international development  strategies 
as currently applied.  For  them,  the  idea  that  the 
transfer of capital,  skills and  technology  from  the 
rich countries will  lead  to  "self-sustained"  growth 
is already  in  the  process of  being  modified. 
Political solidarity of  Third  World 
In  spite ~of the  increase of centrifugal  forces,  the 
countries of the  South  have  maintained  a'high  degree 
of political cohesion  and  a  common  perception of  the 
need  to bring world  economic  structures  into better 
balance.  They  have  a  strong  feeling  of common 
identity towards  the  advanced  industrialised nations 
of either East  or  West.  In  this  respect  the  term 
"Third  World"  is  a  misnomer.  It was  coined  (by  the 
West)  at  a  time  when  East-West  rivalries dominated 
worldwide  g~opolitical relations.  The  developing 
countries,  the majority of  whom  were  just emerging 
from  colonial domination  in  the  late  1950's  and 
early  1960's,  belonged  to neither  camp.  Their 
leaders  recognised  this  themselves  by  refusing  to  be 
drawn  into the  rich world's  ideological confrontation 
and  creating  the non-aligned  move~ent of which  the 
overwhelming  majority of developing  countries still 
form  part. - 8  -
Attempts  to launch  a  global North-South  dialogue  to 
prepare  for  the creation of  a  New  International 
Economic  Order  (NIEO)  sought  by  the  Third  World  has 
not  been  frustrated  by  conflicts of  interest among 
the  developing  nations  themselves.  The  principal 
problem has been posed  by  hesitations by  the western 
industrialised nations  as  to  how  far  they  should  go 
towards  meeting  Third  World  demands.  A secondary 
problem  has  been  the  absence  of  the  Soviet  Union  and 
its eastern European  allies  from  the dialogue. 
The  North-South  dialogue  is  in  fact  a  West-South 
one.  The  communist  states have  refused  to participate 
ostensibly  because  they  reject  any  post-colonial 
responsibility for  the  predicament  of  the developing 
countries.  To  this must  be  added  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  Union  and  its partners  are  less dependent  on 
the  energy  and  other  raw  material  resources  of  the 
Third  World  than  the  West,  particularly the  countries 
of  western  Europe  and  Japan. 
Third  World  solidarity,  although  subject  to  its own 
internal strains  and  tensions,  has  been  maintained 
through  the successive  North-South  negotiations  in 
recent  years  in virtually all  the  forums where  they  have 
taken  place.  It has been  reaffirmed at successive 
meetings  of  the  UN  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
(UNCTAD)  and  conferences  of  the  non-aligned  movement. 
It is based  - for  the  NIC's,  the oil exporting  countries 
of  OPEC  and  the  poorest  nations  alike  - on  the  awareness 
of  their  unequal  relationship with  the  industrialised 
world. - 9  -
Group  of  77  - The  voice of the Third  World 
The  aspirations of  the  Third  World  have  cristallised 
around  the  so-called Group of  77.  These  were  the 
number  of developing  countries  which  attended  the 
first session of  the  UN  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development  in  Geneva  in  1964.  It has  kept  its name 
although  the  number  of  its members  now  exceeds  115. 
But  the  roots of  the  Third  World  go  back  further. 
A group of  29  developing  countries  from  Africa  and 
Asia,  including  China,  got together  for  the  first 
time  in  1955  in  the  Indonesian city of  Bandung. 
In  their  final declaration,  the  29  listed their 
demands  for  accelerating  development  of  the  poor 
countries.  These  include  the  need  for  a  UN  fund  for 
economic  development,  the stabilisation of  trade 
flows  and  raw  material prices  through  international 
agreements,  the organisation of cooperation  between 
developing  and  industrialised nations  as  well  as 
among  Third  World  states themselves.  More  than  a 
quarter of  a  century later,  many  of  these  demands 
are still on  the  table. 
The  Group  of  77  is not  a  formal  organisation.  Its 
function  is to coordinate  Third  World  strategy  in 
international negotiations.  It is of necessity the 
sum  of its parts.  Yet  its cohesion  in  the  North-
South context has  been  greater  than  that of  the 
industrialised countries  themselves  where  differences 
have  persisted particularly between  the  European 
Community  and  the  United  States.  The  Group  of  77 
has  remained  united  even  to  the extent of  reconciling 
clear conflicts of  interest over  energy  policy  between 
OPEC  countries  and  the  oil-importing  countries of  the 
Third  World.  Tensions  within  the  77  hover  below  the  surface. - 10  -
The  NIC's  and  other middle  income  countries, 
particularly in Latin America,  appear  to  be  the  most 
conciliatory members  of  the  group  in  its relations 
with  the  industrialised countries. 
The  industrialised countries  have  so  far  refrained 
from  exploiting  to  any  major  extent  the  divergences 
within  the  Group  of  77.  In  the  early stages of  the 
North-South dialogue  after  the  1973-74 oil price 
explosion,  efforts were  made  to drive  a  wedge  between 
the  OPEC  countries  and  the  rest of  the  Third  World,  but 
these  proved  unsuccessful  and  were  soon  abandoned. 
Regional  organisations 
While  the  Group  of  77  is  the  global  umbrella  for  the 
whole  of  the  Third  World,  the  developing  countries 
are  also divided  into  subgroups  on  a  geographic, 
political or  economic  basis.  Thus,  the  developing 
countries of  Latin  American  and  the  Caribbean  are 
grouped  in  the Organisation of  American  States  (OAS), 
while  at sub-regional  level,  there  is  a  fledgling 
Caribbean  Common  Market  (Caricom)  and,further  south, 
the  Andean  Pact.  African nations  have  grouped 
themselves  in  the  Organisation of African  Unity  (OAU), 
while  the  Arab  States of North  Africa  and  the 
Middle  East all  belong  to the  Arab  League. - 1  1  -
Asia  has  no  continental organisation,  but  the 
world's  two  most  populous  nations,  China  and  India 
belong  to this  region.  These  countries,  of sub-
continental dimensions  themselves,  account  for 
more  than  50%  of  the  total population of  the 
developing  world.  Although  ranged  among  the  low 
income  developing  countries  (see  Table  I)  each  has 
a  broadly-based  industrial sector  including  textiles, 
heavy  and  light engineering  as  well  as  a  nuclear 
sector  and  a  fledgling  space exploration  programme. 
Despite  their  immense  populations  (China  1  billion, 
India  700 million),  their per  capita GNP  is higher 
than  the  average  for  the  rest of  the  low  income  group 
and  their  export  dependence  on  primary  products 
considerably  lower. 
China's development  policy has  been  one  of self-
reliance with little help  from  outside.  It has 
received credits  in  recent years  from  industrialised 
countries  to financeimports  from  them  but  is still 
cautious  about  borrowing  from  abroad  on  a  large 
scale.  In  receives virtually no  official development 
aid.  According  to  OECD  figures  it received 
17  million Dollars of  foreign  aid a  year  between 
1976  and  1980  (see  Table  III). - 12  -
TABLE  III 
PORJLATirn  AND  NEl'  REX::EIPI'S  OF  ODA  Fin-1  ALL 
SOORCES  FOR  SELEX:TED  CCXJNTRIES 
(1976-1980  annual averages) 
Populatt.ion  Net  receipts 
Total  Per  head 
millions  $ millions  $ 
China  965  17  .. 
India  658  1,530  2 
Bangladesh  87  1,156  13 
Pakistan  79  605  8 
Egypt  41  1,433  35 
Tanzania  18  587  33 
Kenya  16  351  23 
Ivory Coast  8  139  17 
French  POlynesia  0.2  144  959 
Source  OECD,  Development  Cooperation  (several  issues) • 
India  receives  much  more  official foreign  aid  but  even 
this,  given  the  size of  the  population  is  a  mere  drop 
in  the  ocean.  It received an  average of  1.53 billion DJllars 
in the  1976-1980 period,  the equivalent of $2  per head  of the population. 
Although  it receives little aid  from  the  European 
Community  as  such  (less  than  100  million  Dollars  for  the 
1976-80 period)  India  is one  of  the  major  beneficiaries 
of  financial  assistance  from  individual  governments, 
particularly Britain  and  the  Netherlands.  One  of 
India's chronic  problems  has  been  its inability to  feed 
itself.  This  is changing  and  the  country  is  for  instance 
approaching  self-sufficiency  in  food  grains.  Another 
major  concern,  the  gap  between  rich  and  poor  within  the 
country,is  not  narrowing.  In  Indian  states accounting 
for  about  one  third of  the  total population, there  has 
been  virtually no  per  capita  income  growth  for  the 
past  20  years. - 13  -
Both  India  and  China  represent large markets  for 
·capital goods  from  the  developed  countries  as  they 
continue  their  industrialisation.  Th~ir potential 
as  markets  for  consumer  goods  as  their  living 
standards  rise is also enormous. 
The  only sub-regional  grouping  in  Asia  is  ASEAN 
- the Association of South-East Asian  Nations. 
Founded  in  1967  as  a  vaguely  anti-Communist  grouping 
at  the  time of  the  Vietnam conflict,  it includes  OPEC 
member  Indonesia,  a  NIC  in  the  form  of  Singapore, 
plus  Thailand,  Malaysia  and  the  Philippines who  are 
often considered  as  NIC's-to-be.  The  ASEAN  countries 
are  considered potentially  important  trading partners 
by  European  countries  and  the  United  States,  although 
they  are geographically closer  to Japan.  Among  the 
Europeans,  the  Germans  have  been  particularly strong 
supporters of  ASEAN  and  were  largely  instrumental  in 
securing  the  EEC-ASEAN  cooperation  agreement  which 
was  concluded  in  1980.  However,  the  impact of  the 
current  recession  has  slowed  the  progress of  the 
member  states of  the  group.  Regional  integration 
among  the  ASEAN  states has  been  modest.  They  do 
less  than  10%  of their  trade with  each  other 
(Singapore,  with  a  figure  of  nearly  20%,  because  of 
its entrepot trade,  is  the  exception). 
OPEC 
OPEC  is the  single most  powerful  Third  World 
organisation.  It is not  organised  along  regional 
lines,  although  the  majority of its members  come 
from  the oil-rich regions of  the Middle  East  and 
North  Africa.  Although  it produces  less  than  one-
third of world output,  OPEC  still dominates  world 
trade  in oil.  This  position  enables  the organisation - 14  -
to maintain its determining  role  as price leader. 
As  Table  IV  shows,  OPEC  is  no  longer  the  biggest 
supplier of oil to  the  non-Communist  world.  Non-
OPEC  supplies are expected  to cover  an  even  larger 
share  in  the years  to  come.  Although  there  is  a 
relative decline  in  OPEC's  importance,  it remains 
certain that at  any  time  in  the  foreseeable  future, 
a  major  disruption of  OPEC  shipments  could  have 
very  serious consequences  on  the  industrialised 
countries  and  the developing  nations  which  depend 
on  them  for  their  supplies. 
TABLE  IV 
OIL  DEMAND  AND  SUPPLY 
millions of barrels per day 
1981  --
Non-oPEC  consumption  45.2 
Industrial countries  36.2 
Non-DPEC  LOC' s  9.0 
Non-QP:OC  supply *  23.3 
OP:OC.exports  21.2 
1982  1983  -- --
43.5  43.9 
34.3  34.4 
9.2  9.4 
23.9  24.6 
17.5  19.5 
* Includes Oomrnunist  countries'  net oil exports to the West. 
Source  :  fobrgan  Guaranty,  WOrld  Financial Markets  (September 
1982. 
OPEC,  which  was  founded  in  1960 essentially as  a 
coalition of  producer  countries  to counter-balance 
the  power  of  the  multinational  petroleum corporations, 
is  far  from  being  a  homogeneous  group. - 15  -
"Politically",  the  OPEC  members  are  sometimes 
regarded  as  falling  into  two  groups,  progressive 
and  conservative.  Algeria,  Nigeria,  Libya,  Iraq  and 
Iran can  be  considered  as  belonging  to  the  progressive 
group.  Saudi  Arabia,  the  Gulf  States,  Venezuela  and 
Indonesia are  in  the  latter group. 
"Economically",  the  OPEC  members  with  large 
populations  require  their oil revenues  to  finance 
their  own  internal development,  while  those  with  a 
relatively small  population  can  use  their surplus 
revenue  in  investments,  loans  and  grants outside their 
frontiers.  Generally  speaking,  "progressive"  OPEC 
states  and  those  with  large populations  have  tended  to 
favour  strategies which  bring  in  maximum  oil revenues 
while  the others  have  backed  policies which  stabilise 
prices  and  earnings. 
The  OPEC  members  (each  with  its  1982  quotas  and 
population)  are  : 
TABLE  V 
'CXX)  barrels/  Population  day 
(millions) 
Saudi  Arabia  7,000  9.0 
Libya  1,300  3.0 
Kuwait  650  1.4 
United Arab  Emirates  1,000  1.0 
Qatar 
Iran 
Iraq 
Nigeria 
Algeria 
Gabon 
Venezuela 
Ecuador 
Indonesia 
Source 
300 
1,200  38.8 
1,200  13.1 
1,300  84.7 
750  18.9 
150  o. 7 
1,500  14.9 
200  8.0 
1,300  146.6 
Petroleum  Intelligence Weekly and 
W::>r ld Bank • - 16  -
The  Newly  Industrialising Countries  (NIC's) 
The  NIC's  are  a  small  number  of Third  World 
countries  whose  export-oriented  economies  have 
achieved  very  rapid  growth  rates  in  recent  years. 
They  are  not  a  formal  grouping  and  the  term  "NIC" 
is not necessarily one  they  would  accept. 
In  UNCTAD  terminology,  they  are described  as  the 
"Fast-growing exporters of manufactures".  UNCTAD 
defines  them  as  developing countries  with  a  per 
capita  income  in  1977  greater  than  $1,000  and 
whose  exports of manufactured  goods  exceeded  20% 
of  their total exports.  UNCTAD  lists these countries 
as  Argentina,  Brazil,  South  Korea,  Singapore,  Uruguay, 
Yugoslavia  and  Hong  Kong.  Other  organisations give 
other definitions  and  other lists of  NIC's. 
The  OECD,  for  instance,  includes  several of  its own 
members  from  Southern  Europe  among  the  NIC's.  The 
common  core  to most  lists of  newly  industrialising 
countries would  be  Brazil,  South  Korea,  Singapore, 
Hong  Kong  and  Taiwan.  Taiwan  does  not  figure  on 
the  UNCTAD  list since it left the  UN  after  its 
former  seat was  given  to  the  Chinese  People's 
Republic. 
Despite  their diversity  in size  and  population 
(Brazil  is  a  vast country of  118  million people 
while  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong  are little more  than 
city-states),  the  NIC's  have  one  factor  in  common 
their  reliance on  export  promotion  and  access  to 
world  markets  as  a  major  source of  expansion  for 
their manufacturing  and  industrial sectors.  The 
NIC's  account  for  75%  of  the  total manufactured 
exports of  the  Third  World  as  a  whole.  Although 
labour-intensive products  in  which  they  have  a 
comparative  advantage,  such  as clothing,  footwear 
and  electronics,  were  at  the  heart of  their - 17  -
industrialisation process,  they  have  started 
to penetrate markets  of more  capital  intensive 
industries  such  as  shipbuilding,  machinery  and 
basic chemicals.  The  NIC's  also  take  65%  of 
manufactured  imports of  the developing  countries 
as  they  buy  in  the capital goods  needed  to develop 
their  industrial sectors. 
But  as they began  to penetrate  the  markets  of  the 
industrialised countries on  a  major  scale,  the 
latter reacted  against  the  too great success of 
the  NIC's  in emulating  their own  economic 
development  pattern.  The  industrialised countries 
increasingly  forced  the  NIC's  to  accept  "voluntary" 
limits on  their  shipments of  manufactured  goods  to 
"Northern"  markets  or  imposed  unilateral restrictions 
on  imports of these products. 
At  the  same  time,  the  industrialised countries  are 
urging  the NIC's  to open  up  their  own  markets  to 
imports  from  the  industrialised nations.  They 
increasingly argue  that  the  NIC's  have  progressed 
far  enough  in  their  development  to  "graduate"  to 
the  same  status  as  the  advanced  countries  and 
respect  the  same  rules  as  the  OECD  countries  for 
their  foreign  trade.  Already  the  NIC's  are 
benefitting  less  from  the provisions of  the - 18  -
Generalised  System of Preferences  (GSP)  operated 
by  developed  countries  in  favour  of manufactured 
imports  from  the developing  world.  The  industrialised 
countries are  urging  them  to end  their  system of 
export  subsidies  and  other  aids  used  to  boost  sales 
to  foreign  markets. 
The  NIC's  have  run  up  surpluses  in  their  trade 
with many  industrialised countries  (see  Table  VI  for 
EEC  figures)  but  these  have  not  been  growing  so  fast 
in  recent  years  under  the  combined  impact of  the 
world  recession  and  the protectionist action  taken 
against  them  by  the  advanced  nations. 
The  dynamic  development of the NIC's  is held out 
by  one  school of development  strategists, particularly 
strong  in  the  United  States  as  proof  that self-
reliance  and  the  harnessing of  market  forces  offer  the 
best development  formula  for  the  Third  World  as  a 
whole. 
TABLE  VI 
Brazil 
Hong  Kong 
Taiwan 
s.  Korea 
Singapore 
NIC 1 s  TRADING  BALANCE  WI'IH  EEX: 
( 1978-80) 
(in  billions of  Ecus) 
1978  1979  1980 
0.92  1.23  1. 59 
0.59  1.00  1.47 
0.54  0.81  1.30 
0.42  0.44  1.03 
- 0.42  - 0.37  0.15 
Source  Eurostat. - 19  -
The  Least  Developed  Countries  (LLDC's) 
At  the  other  end  of  the  development  spectrum  from 
the  NIC's  are  the  group of  31  Least  Developed 
Countries.  Two-thirds  of  them  are  in Africa. 
Food  production  per  capita  in  most  of  the  Least 
Developed  Countries  has  fallen  by  10%  over  the 
past  ten  years  and  an  estimated  25%  to  30%  of 
their  population  is hungry or  undernourished  for 
the  gr~ater part of  the  year.  Their  real  per 
capita  income  has  also decreased  over  the  past 
decade  (see  Table VII).  These  countries are  poorly 
equipped  to  absorb external  shocks  and  to adjust 
their  economies  to changing  world  conditions. 
They  are  so  poorly  endowed  with  natural  resources 
and  human  skills that  there  is  no  foundation  on  which 
a  self-help development  strategy can  be  based. 
"'lb expect their salvation as  a  result of the benevolent 
working  of market mechanisms  or commercial  activity 
is to be  utopian or fraudulent".  (1) 
The  LLDC's,  having  failed  to  benefit  from  the 
favourable  growth  climate of  the  1960's  and  early 
1970's,  are clearly threatened  with  further 
impovrishment during  the  recession of  the  1980's. 
Official development  assistance  (ODA)  is  therefore 
ofcrucial  importance  for  them.  At  the  Paris 
conference on  the  problems of  the  LLDC's  in  October 
1981,  a  number  of  industrialised countries,  including 
the  members  of  the  European  Community,agreed  to set 
aside  20%  of  their  public  aid  to  the  Third  World  for 
the  LLDC's.  This  is  the  equivalent of  0.15%  of  the 
advanced  CQuntries' GDP.  Ofthe  EEC  countries,  only 
the  Netherlands  (0.23)  and  Denmark  (0.22)  had 
previously  reached  this level. 
(1)  EEC  Development  Commisioner  Edgard  Pisani  at  the 
Conference  on  the  LLDC's  (Paris,  September  1981). - 20  -
The  31  LLDC'&,  whose  total population  is about 
250  million,  a~e  :  Afghanistan,  Bangladesh,  Benin, 
Bhutan,  Botswana,  Burundi,  Cape  Verde,  Central 
African  Republic,  Chad,  Comoros,_Ethiopia,  Gambia, 
Guinea,  Guinea-Bisseau,  Haiti,  Laos,  Lesotho,  Malawi, 
Maldives,  Mali,  Nepal,  Niger,  Rwanda,  Samoa,  Somalia, 
Sudan,  Uganda,  Tanzania,  Upper  Volta,  North  Yemen, 
South  Yemen. 
t-· 
TABLE  VII 
GRaoli'H  RATES  OF  REAL  IN~  OF  DE.VELOPING  COONTRIES 
(per  cent per  annum) 
196Q-1970  197G-19RO 
REAL  INCGiE 
Tbtal developing countries  5.0  7.1 
Major  oil-exporting countries  3.6  14.0 
Fast-growing exporters of manuf.  6.3  6.6 
Leastdeveloped countries  2.6  2.3 
PER  CAPITA  PEAL  IN<XJ'.1E 
Tbtal developing countries  2.4  4.5 
Major  oil-exporting countries  0.9  11. 1 
Fast-growing exporters of manuf.  3.5  4.0 
Ieastdeveloped countries  o.o  - 0.3 
Source  :  UNCTAD  secretariat estimates. 
The  Table  reveals  inadequately  the  ov~rall poverty 
of  these nations.  The  economic  plight of  the least 
developed  countries  is  reinforced  by  other,  notably 
social,  factors.  Life  expectancy  is still less  than 
48  years  in most  of  them,  and  can  be  as  low  as  39 
years  in  Upper  Volta  and  40  in  Ethiopia.  Yet  their 
populations  are growing  faster  than  any  other  group 
of countries.  Their  average  adult literacy is  33% - 21  -
with  lows  of  5%  in Niger  and  Upper  Volta  and  9% 
in Mali.  In  Guinea  and  Mali,  only  10%  of  the 
population  has  access  to  safe drinking  water,  while 
ther  is only one  doctor  for  75,000 people  in Ethiopia. 
International strategies  for  the  advancement of  the 
NIC's  are clearly unsuited  for  the poorest developing 
nations.  While  it is  true that the  majority of  the 
Third  World  countries  belong  to neither  group,  the 
bulk  of  them  have  more  in  common  with  the  LLDC's, 
many  of whose  problems  they  share  in  more  attenuated 
form,  than with  the  NIC's. - 22  -
DEVELOPMENT  IN  CRISIS 
WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  IS  IN  CRISIS.  SEVERAL  FACTORS  HAVE 
HOW  COME  TOGETHER  TO  EXPOSE  THE  LIMITATIONS  OF  THE 
DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGY  DEVISED  AND  IMPLEMENTED  DUR+NG 
THE  FIRST  TWO  DEVELOPMENT  DECADES  OF  THE  1960's  AND 
1970's.  THIS  STRATEGY  WAS  BASED  ON  THE  PRINCIPLE 
THAT  THIRD  WORLD  COUNTRIES  SHOULD  INTEGRATE  THEIR 
ECONOMIES  RAPIDLY  INTO  THE  WORLD  MARKET  NETWORK. 
THE  WINNING  FORMULA,  WHICH  COULD  ENABLE  THE  DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  TO  "CATCH  UP"  WITH  THE  ADVANCED  NATIONS, 
WAS  BASED  ON  GOVERNMENT-LED  EXPORT-ORIENTED  INDUSTRI-
ALISATION,  COUPLED  WITH  TRADE,  AID  AND  PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT  COMMITMENTS  FROM  THE  INDUSTRIALISED 
COUNTRIES. 
THIS  STRATEGY  WAS  STRONGLY  BACKED  BY  THE  WESTERN 
INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES  WHO  COULD  POINT  TO  THE 
LARGE-SCALE  BENEFITS  THEY  HAD  DERIVED  FROM  THE  POST-
WAR  FREE-MARKET  ENVIRONMENT  AND  THE  STRUCTURES  (GATT, 
IMF,  ETC)  THEY  HAD  SET  UP  TO  SUPPORT  IT. 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  HAD  NO  CHOICE  BUT  TO  ACCEPT  THIS 
APPROACH,  ALTHOUGH  MANY  OF  THEIR  EXPERTS  FELT 
STRONGLY  THAT  THIS  "LINEAR"  VIEW  OF  PROGRESS  AND 
GROWTH  BEGGED  A SERIES  OF  FUNDAMENTAL  QUESTIONS  AS  TO 
THE  NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  UNDERDEVELOPMENT. 
BY  THE  LATE  1970's,  IT  WAS  CLEAR  THAT  THE  STRATEGY  WAS 
NO  LONGER  WORKING.  THE  WORLDWIDE  RECESSION  WAS 
UNDOUBTEDLY  A MAJOR  REASON.  BUT  IT  ALSO  SERVED  TO 
HIGHLIGHT  ALREADY  EXISTING  PROBLEMS. 
IN  MANY  INSTANCES,  THE  WRDNG  PRIORITIES  WERE  CHOSEN 
BY  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  THEMSELVES.  RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT  AND  FOOD  PRODUCTION  WERE  OFTEN  NEGLECTED: 
"PRESTIGE"  PROJECTS,  INAPPROPRIATE  FOR  THIRD  WORLD - 23  -
COUNTRIES,  WERE  UNDERTAKEN;  FINANCIAL  AID  WAS  MISUSED. 
GOVERNMENTS,  PARTICULARLY  IN  THE  POOREST  COUNTRIES, 
WERE  TOO  ENMESHED  IN  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  DAY-TO-DAY 
ECONOMIC  SURVIVAL  TO  BE  ABLE  TO  DEVISE  LONGER-TERM 
STRATEGIES.  FOR  THEIR  PART,  INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES 
HAVE  FOUND  IT  INCREASINGLY  DIFFICULT  TO  MEET 
PREVIOUSLY  DECLARED  COMMITMENTS  ON  TRADE,  AID, 
CREDITS  AND  INVESTMENTS. 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  IS  IN  THE  FOREFRONT  OF  EFFORTS 
TO  CONSTRUCT  A MORE  RELEVANT  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGY 
FOR  THE  1980's  AND  BEYOND. - 24  -
The  shortcomings of  previous  strategies 
The  political emancipation of  the  Third  World  by 
the  early  1960's gave  rise to expectations  that 
economic  advancement  would  quickly  follow.  The 
eradication of  poverty,  the  improvement  in  the 
quality of  life,  a  rise  in  living  standards  were 
accepted  by  the  world  community  as  legitimate 
aspirations  for  the  newly  independent  majority of 
less developed  nations.  The  development  strategy 
focussed  on  what  were  seen  as  the  constraints  on 
development,  particularly  the  lack  of capital, 
whose  remoyal  would  set free  the  "natural"  forces 
latent  in  the poorer  countries  that  would  facilitate 
their  economic  advancement.  This  approach  called on 
the  rich countries  to  supply  the  missing  elements  to 
the developing  countries  which  would  enable  them  to 
remove  the  main  obstacles  to  development  or  at  least 
break  the  bottlenecks  that had  built up.  Financial 
aid,  technical assistance,  trade concessions,  direct 
investments  were  to  be  the principal  instruments. 
This  strategy has,  until  recently,worked  for  the  more 
advanced  developing  countries  - the  NIC's  and  their 
closest emulators  - but  it has  been  less successful 
in  improving  the  lot of  the  majority of developing 
nations. - 25  -
The  reasons for  the crisis 
There  is  no  shortage of  reasons  for  explaining  why 
development  is  in crisis.  Although  the  world 
recession  is  the  most  convenient  scapegoat,  the 
industrialised nations  and  the  developing  countries 
themselves  must  bear  their  share of  responsibility 
for  the  disappoining  record  of  20  years  of  world 
development.  It is  true  that  the  slowdown  of  demand 
in  the  rich countries  has  reduced  the  export outlets 
for  the  Third  World  and  depressed  the  prices of 
their  raw  materials.  It is also  true  that  the 
unexpected  duration of  the  recession  has  brought  some 
heavily  indebted  developing  countries  to  the  brink  of 
bankruptcy,  while  it has  slowed  the  flow  of official 
aid  from  rich  to  poor  countries.  The  recession  has 
also  increased  the  South-South  gap. 
But  many  problems  are  rooted  in  the  complexity of  the 
process  of  development  itself.  Mistakes  and  errors 
have  been  made  at  a  number  of  levels  by  the  North  and 
the  South,  separately  and  together.  To  take  just one 
example,  the  industrialised countries  have  consistently 
urged  the  Third  World  to  integrate  into 
the  existing world  economic  order.  For  them,  the  r~ad 
to development  lay  through  a  much  improved  Old  Order 
rather  than  the  creation of  the  New  International 
Economic  Order  (NIEO)  that  had  become  one  of  the  Third 
World's  main  slogans.  Yet the North  has  long  since 
stopped  playing  by  its own  rules.  As  one  development 
economist  put it as  early as  1976 
the rich •••  are drawing  a  protective wall around 
their lifestyles, telling the poor  nations that 
they can compete  neither with their labour  nor 
with their goods  but paying  handsome  tributes at 
the same  time to the  "free" working  of the 
international market mechanism.  (1) 
(1)  M.Ul-Haq,  The  Poverty  Curtain  (Columbia  University Press), 
1976. - 26  -
At  another  level,  the  advanced  nations  have  not  been 
able  to  reconcile  the conflicting  interests of  their 
commitment  to meaningful  Third  World  development  with 
their  national  economic  priorities. This split has 
manifested  itself in  their  readiness  to provide 
sophisticated capital equipment  for  grandiose  projects 
beyond  the  requirements  of  many  of  the  developing  countries 
which  have  asked  for  them and  in  their  readiness  to sell 
arms  to  the  Third  World. 
But  the  responsibility of  the developing  countries  is 
equally great.  In  many  cases,  they  have  neglected  food 
production,  used  external  finance  for  encouraging 
consumption  instead of productive  investment,  failed  to 
distribute what  benefits  that  have  materialised  among 
the different sections of  their  population.  The 
following  pages  look  briefly at  some  of  the  areas  where 
development  has  gone  wrong. 
a)  Food  production 
With  the  notable  exceptions of  Latin  America,  China, 
India  and  a  few  others,  Third  World  food  production 
has  been  totally inadequate.  More  and  more  developing 
countries  are dependent  on  food  imports. 
The  reasons  for  declining  food  production  are  several. 
Climatic conditions  such  as  periodic droughts  in  the 
Sahel  region of Africa or  inadequate  monsoon  rains 
in  Asia  can  provoke  serious  shortages.  But  most  other 
p~oblem are  man-made.  Economic  policies pursued  by  a 
number  of developing  countries either deliberately or 
unwittingly operate  against  the  interests of  the 
farming  population  in  rural  areas.  These  governments, 
more  conscious of  the  consumer  needs  of  the  more 
volatile  urban  masses  (and  of  the  military), 
have  tended to keep  food  prices  low  but  in  so doing 
have  discouraged  local  food  production.  In  some  cases, - 27  -
developing  countries cling  to overvalued  exchange 
rates  which  make  imports  of capital goods  for 
industrialisation and  food  for  the cities cheaper 
than  home-produced  items.  This  trend  can  lead  to 
permanent  changes  in  eating  habits  in  favour  of 
imported  items.  The  problems  related  to  Third  World 
agriculture  and  food  production  are  examined  in  more 
detail  in  the  following  chapter. 
b)  Rural  depopulation 
One  of  the  consequence  of  the  stagnation or  decline 
in rural earnings  has  been  to  encourage  the  population 
exodus  towards  the cities.  This  rapid  and  uncontrolled 
urban  growth  is putting  extreme  pressure  on  sanitation 
facilities,  water  supplies,  health,  food,  shelter  and 
jobs.  Its  impact  is  exacerbated  by  the  population 
explosion  (a  higher  birthrate,  but essentialy  a  lower 
death  rate)  in  the  Third  World.  Sprawling  urbanisation 
and  its attendant miseries  are characteristics of  most 
developing  countries,  NIC's  and  LLDC's  alike. 
Table  I  shows  that if present  trends were  to continue,  Mexico 
City's population would  exceed  31  million people  by  the 
year  2000.  Calcutta,  Bombay,  Seoul,  Jakarta,  Cairo  ~nd 
Karachi  would  have  populations  in  the  16-20 million 
range.  The  figures  are  taken  from  a  report  "Global  2000" 
issued  by  the  United  States government  in  1980. 
At  least a  quarter of  the  population of  these cities 
is already living  in  slums  and  shanty  towns.  Even  if 
these  forecasts  are  exaggerated,  and  there  are  signs 
that  lack  of  food  for  the  urban  poor,  lack  of  jobs, 
increasing  illness  and  injury  may  alter  the  trend,  the 
situation will nonetheless  remain critical for  a  long 
time  to  come. - 28  -
TABLE  I 
ESTIMATES  AND  IOJGH  PRO.:JEC'I'ICNS  OF  SELECl'ED  URBAN 
AGGLCMF'.RATICNS  IN  OE.VEIDPING  COONTRIES 
Millions of persons 
1960  1970  1975  2CXX> 
Calcutta  5.5  6.9  8.1  19.7 
Mexico  City  4.9  8.6  10.9  31.6 
Greater Bombay  4.1  5.8  7.1  19.1 
Greater Cairo  3.7  5.7  6.9  16.4 
Jakarta  2.7  4.3  5.6  16.9 
Seoul  2.4  5.4  7.3  18.7 
Delhi  2.3  3.5  4.5  13.2 
Manila  2.2  3.5  4.4  12.7 
Tehran  1.9  3.4  4.4  13.8 
Karachi  1.8  3.3  4.5  15.9 
Bogota  1.7  2.6  3.4  9.5 
Lagos  0.8  1.4  2.1  9.4 
Source  The  Global  2000  report to the President  (US  State 
Dept,  1980) .• 
Excessive  urban  populations  is part of  the overall 
problem of  population  growth  in  the  Third  World  in  the 
corning  20  years.  From  the  1980  figure  of  around  4.5 
billion,  the  world  population  may  rise  to  5.5-6  billion by 
the  year  2000.  At  the  end  of  the  century,  70%  of  the 
Third  World's  population will probably  be  concentrated 
in only eight countries  :  China,  India,  Indonesia, 
Brazil,  Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  Nigeria  and  Mexico. 
The  implications  for  these countries  and  other  developing 
nations,  for  whom  the  problem exists  in  less acute  form, 
are clear  :  it requires  large  investments  just to maintain 
par  capita  infrastructure at present  levels;  it swells  the 
labour  force  and  depresses  wages;  it speeds  migration  to 
urban  areas;  it makes  it more  difficult to  combat  mal-
nutrition  and  poverty;  it tends  to produce  an  age  structure 
where  each  worker  supports  a  large  number  of  non-working 
persons. - 29  -
c)  Uneven  benefits within  individual  countries 
Poverty  therefore  is not  just a  problem  for  the 
least developed  countries.  It must  be  remembered 
that  there are more  poor  people outside  the  LLDC's 
than within  this group of countries.  Many  other 
Third  World  states have  considerable  pockets  of 
absolute  poverty  in  their  midst.  For  instance,  the 
FAO  singles out  12  countries  that suffer  from  under-
nourishment  on  a  vast scale.  (1)  These  are  India 
(with  201  million  underfed),  Indonesia  (33),  Bangladesh 
(27),  Nigeria  (14),  Brazil,  Ethiopia  and  Pakistan  (12 
each),  the  Philippines  (10),  Afgh~nistan  (6),  and 
Burma,  Colombia  and  Thailand  (5  each).  These  are  in 
addition  ~o  some  of  the  LLDC's,  notably  Chad,  Ethiopia 
and  Haiti,  where  more  than  40%  of  the  population  does 
not get  enough  to eat. 
The  process of development  has  in  fact often  been 
accompanied  by  growing  income disparities  in  individual 
countries.  The  classic school of  Third  World 
# 
development strategists set great  importance  on  economic 
growth  as  the  main  criterion of  advancement,  not  because 
growth  was  the most  suitable goal  in  itself,  but  because 
its fruits  would  "trickle down"  naturally to  the  poorest 
sections of  the population or  else governments  would 
intervene  to make  sure  they  were  redistributed  fairly. 
Others  considered  that  inequalities  and  the  temporary 
concentration of  wealth  in  a  few  hands  were  also  a 
precondition  for  growth. 
None  of  these  assumptions  stands  up  to examination. 
In  many  countries,  growth  is concentrated  on  a  small 
modern  industrial sector grafted onto  a  predominantly 
underdeveloped  basic  structure.  In  addition,  governments 
have  proved  unwilling  or  unable  to  use  taxation  and 
social services to offset  the  impact of growing  internal 
(1)  FAO,  The  Dimensions  of  Needs  (Rome  1981). - 30  -
inequalities.  Finally,  the concentration of  income 
in  the  hands  of  the  rich  has  rarely proved 
a  prerequisite of  rapid  development.  It has  only 
served  to reinforce  the  growing  gap  between  the 
ruling elites and  the  broad  mass  of  their populations. 
d)  The  arms  trade 
The  accentuation of  such  inequalities has  caused  social 
tension  and  conflict,  leading  to  the  overthrow 
of  governments,  civil wars  and  other  upheavals. 
The  need  to  avoid,  or  repress,  such  happenings  is  a 
contributory factor  to  the  large-scale  arms  purchases 
by  Third  World  governments.  The  other,  main,  factor 
is intra-regional  rivalries between  neighbouring  states. 
Governments  around  the  world  spend  450 billion Dollars 
annually  on  armaments.  Third  World  states are 
in  fact major  clients for  arms  sales  by  the  advanced 
countries of both  East  and  West.  They  spend  four 
times  the  amount  they  receive  in  aid  on military 
hardware.  The  west sells more  weapons  to developing 
countries  than does  the  eastern bloc,  although 
estimates vary.  According  to  the latest US  figures, 
nearly  70 billion Dollars worth  of  arms  were  sold  to 
developing  countries  by  industrialised nations  in 
the  period  1977-1980. 
The  Americans  and  their allies accounted  for  more 
than  37  billion Dollars  (Table  II). TABLE  II 
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ARMS  DELIVERIES  TO  THE  THIRD  WORLD 
(in  US  $  millions) 
1977-1980 
Soviet Union 
United States 
France 
United Kingdom 
West  Germany 
Italy 
Other  Free  ~r  ld 
other Cormnunist 
'IDI.'AL 
Source  US  Arms control and 
disarmament  agency, 
27,529 
17,260 
6,805 
3,353 
2,861 
1,971 
4,891 
3,738 
69,508 
World  Military expenditures 
and  arms  transfers, 
March  1982. 
The  source  and  destination of  arms  sold  to  the 
developing  countries are  given  in'Table  III which 
is published  in  the  Yearbook  of  the  Stockholm 
International  Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI). 
It identifies the  share of  arms  sold  by  the  United 
States  as  considerably  larger  than  that of  the  Soviet 
U~ion, contrary to  the  American  figures. - 32  -
TABLE  III 
Oceania 
0.01% 
Indian 
sub-continent 
6.4% 
Source 
THE  IMPORI'ERS I  AND  EXPORI'ERS I  SHARES  OF  MAJOR-WEAPOO 
SUPPLIES  'ID THE  THIRD  IDRLD,  1970  - 79 
Third World Importing regions 
Exporting countries 
SIPRI  Yearbook  1980,  Stockholm. 
According  to World  Bank  statistics,  several of  the 
least developed  countries  spend  more  on  defence  (as  a 
percentage of  GNP)  tnan  the  average  of  the  western 
industrialised nations  which  is  3.8%.  Among  the  biggest 
L~DC spenders  are  Tanzania  9.4%,  Somalia  6.8%  and 
Pakistan  5.0%.  Amongst  the  Third  World-countries  themselves, 
the  biggest  arms  sellers  in  South-South  trade  are  Israel 
(26%  of  total Third  World  arms  exports),  followed  by 
Brazil  (21%)and  Iran  and  Jordan  with  9%  each.  (1) 
(1)  These  f1gures  comes  from  SIPRI,  op.cit. - 33  -
e)  The  oil bill 
Arms  trade  is only one  element of  their  external  trade 
in  which  the vast majority of developing  countries  are  in 
deficit.  The  principal deficit sector  is  in oil. 
The  oil bill of  the oil-importing developing  countries 
stood  at  35  billion Dollars  in  1981.  Many  of  these 
countries must  now  use  between  30%  and  50%  of  their 
export  earnings  to pay  for  their oil.  This  proportion 
will decline  very  slowly  even  if oil prices  remain 
stable. 
However,  the  propensity  for  developing  countries  to 
import oil will also  be  influenced  by  the  level  of 
their  indebtedness  and  therefore  their  ability to 
finance  their  purchases  from  abroad.  A number  of 
them  are  already  having  to choose  between  food 
imports  and  imports  of  petroleum.  They  cannot  afford 
both.  For many  non-oil developing  nations,  their  debt 
servicing  commitments  are  the  equivalent of  their 
oil bill.  They  have  had  a  "debt  shock"  coming 
on  top of  the  successive oil shocks  of  1973-74  and 
1979-80.  Debt  and  aid  problems  are dealt with  more 
extensively  in Chapter  VII  of  this document. 
f)  Energy  and  the  fuelwood  crisis 
The  prohibitive cost of  imported  energy  for  many 
developing  countries  have  led  them  to ~eek alternative 
sources.  But  with  few  exceptions  these  have  so  far 
found  only  limited applications. 
Instead  many  people,  particularly  in  rural  areas, 
have  increased  their  use  of  animal  dung  and,  more 
especially,  fuelwood  to meet  their  energy  needs. - 34  -
Fuelwood  supplies  60%  of Africa's  energy  requirements, 
and  some  countries,  such  as  those  of  the  Sahel  zone 
are  95%  dependent  on  this energy  source. 
India,  the  world's  11th  industrial power,  depends  on 
wood  for  53%  of its energy  and  in  some  rural  areas 
wood  dependence  is as  high  as  93%.  Cooking  and 
heating  account  for  90%  of  the  wood  used  in  developing 
countries.  Whereas  forestry  resources  are  expected 
to  remain  stable  in  the  industrialised  regions  they 
may  fall  by  40%  in  the developing  countries  by  the 
year  2000  (Table  V)  • 
TABLE  V 
ESTIMATES  OF  FORESTRY  RESOURCES  IN  1978/2000 
1978  2CXX)  Variation 
Region  million  million  in 
ha  ha  % 
USSR  785  785  -
Europe  140  150  + 7.1 
North  America  470  464  - 1.3 
Japan,  Australia,  New  Zealand  69  68  - 1.5 
SUBTOI'AL  1.464  1.437  - 1.8 
Latin America  550  329  -40.0 
Africa  188  150  -20.0 
Asia  316  181  -43.0 
SUBTOI'AL  1.099  660  -40.0 
TOI'AL  2.563  2.097  -18.2 
----- =====  ===  -----
Source  Global  2000  Report. - 35  -
According  to  the  FAO,  about  100 million  inhabitants 
of  the  Third  World  are  already' unable  to satisfy 
their  minimum  energy  requirements.  The  shortage 
of  fuelwood  affects  1,100 million  people  in 
developing countries,  about  one  third of  their total 
population or  nearly one-quarter -Of  the  people  on  the 
earth.  Wood  is becoming  expensive  in  towns  and  even 
in villages,  as  a  result of its growing  scarcity and 
the  distances  involved  in collecting it.  Prices  in 
some  areas  are rising  at  the  rate of  30%  a  year. 
The  purchase of  fuelwood  places  a  serious strain on 
household  budgets,  accounting  for  as  much  as  50%  of 
a  family's  total expenditure.  A  coherent policy 
of  reafforestation  and  more  rational  use  of wood 
(improved  stoves,  etc)  coupled  with  the  development 
of alternative energy  are  needed  to  save  the Third 
World's  forests  and  avoid  the ecological disaster 
that would  accompany  their disappearance. 
g)  Environmental  damage 
The  excessive  use  of  wood  and  animal  dung  as  well 
as  other  agricultural  residues  for  fuel  adds  to  the 
serious environmental  damage  being  caused  in  the 
Third  World.  The  animal  dung  used  as  fuel  is  no 
longer  available as  natural fertiliser  for  soils 
in  farming  areas.  The  deforestation  because of 
fuelwood  needs  adds  to  the  increasing desertification 
in  areas  where  the clearing of  forests  or  overgrazing 
has  already  brought  about  a  serious deterioration 
in  the  physical environment. 
Forests  retain  rainwater  and  regulate  the  pace  at which 
it runs  off,  they  prevent  soil erosion,  replenish 
certain nutrients  and  influence  the  local climate. 
The  problem  is most  severe  in  densely  populated  hill 
areas  (as  in Latin  America  and  the  Himalayas)  or  in 
arid  areas  of Africa  and  Asia  where  the  desert  advances 
as  the  forests  retreat. - 36  -
Future priorities 
What  therefore  should  be  the  development  priorities 
for  the  rest of  the  1980's  ?  Many  development 
experts,  particularly  in  Europe,  would  probably 
list at least five  : 
1.  Efforts must  be  strengthened  to  meet  the  basic 
needs  of  those  people  in  the  Third  World  who  are 
very  poor.  These  needs  are  for  more  and  better 
food,  access  to safe water  nearby,  health, 
sanitation,  decent  shelter,  education  and  the 
chance  to work.  Only  when  such  needs  are  met 
will  the  least developed  countries  be  in  a  position 
to  pursue  a  development  policy  based  on  self-
reliance. 
2.  A new  emphasis must  be  placed  on  rural  development 
and  the  encouragement  of  local  food  production. 
Agriculture  has  been  lagging,  even  in middle 
income  countries,  slowing  down  the  development 
process.  This entails concentration  on  facilities 
to encourage  rural populations  to  expand  food 
production  and  to  improve  the  quality of  rural life. 
Regional  and  local structures  - commercial,  financial, 
social,  administrative  - need  to  be  put  in place. 
3.  Industrialised countries must  indicate clearly where 
they  stand  on  industrialisation  and  trade.  Despite 
official pronouncements  to  the  contrary,  the  rich 
countries will  have  only  limited  scope  for  pursuing 
trade  liberalisation as  long  as  the  current 
recession lasts.  But  having  entered  into 
commitments,  they  should  respect  them.  They  may 
have  to  say  no  to  unrestricted or  unconditional 
access  for  certain  items,  but'they cannot  encourage, 
often directly,  a  Third  World  industry to start up, 
only  to  bar  its access  to  their marketsonce  it begins 
exporting. (6) 
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4.  The  rich countries  should  seek  to extend 
cooperation with  the  Third  World  oil  importing 
countries  in  the  energy sector.  This  should 
aim  at energy planning  and  prospecting,  and  the 
development of alternative  sources  where 
appropriate.  The  same  kind  of  cooperation could 
also  be  extended  to  the development  of other 
mineral  resources. 
5.  The  industrialised countries  must  help  stop  the 
gradual destruction of  the  natural  environment 
in  some  parts of  the  developing  world. 
There  is,  however,  ho  international consensus  for 
implementing  these priorities as part of  a  new 
updated global strategy.  The  North-South dialogue  is at 
a  standstill.  What  little hope  was  generated at the 
Cancun  summit  in  1981  has  long  since evaporated. 
This  is why  the  European  Community  recognises  that 
with  its special responsibilities,  particularly 
concerning  the African-Caribbean-Pacific  (ACP) 
countries of  the  Lome  Convention  and  its Mediterranean 
neighbours,  it will  have  to concentrate  on  its own 
direct relations with  the  Third  World. - 38  -
FOOD  AND  AGRICULTURE 
\ 
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COLLECTIVELY,  THE  NATIONS  OF  THE  WORLD  HAVE  MADE 
CONSIDERABLE  PROGRESS  OVER  THE  PASJ  30  YEARS  TOWARDS 
GROWING  ENOUGH  FOOD  TO  FEED  THE  PLANET.  BUT  THIS 
PROGRESS  HAS  BEEN  UNEVENLY  SPREAD.  A LARGE  AND 
INCREASING  MINORITY  OF  PEOPLE  IN  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
SUBSIST  ON  A DIET  THAT  PREVENTS  THEM  FROM  LEADING  A 
NORMALLY  ACTIVE  AND  HEALTHY  LIFE.  OF  THE  ONE  BILLION  OR 
SO  VERY  POOR  PEOPLE  IN  THE  WORLD,  ABOUT  450  MILLION  CAN 
BE  CONSIDERED  AS  SERIOUSLY  UNDERNOURISHED. 
IN  WESTERN  EUROPE  AND  NORTH  AMERICA  (PROGRESS  IN  THE 
SOVIET  UNION  AND  PARTS  OF  EASTERN  EUROPE  HAS  BEEN  LESS 
IMPRESSIVE),  AGRICULTURAL  OUTPUT  AND  PRODUCTIVITY  HAVE 
MORE  THAN  KEPT  PACE  WITH  THE  OVERALL  MATERIAL  ADVANCEMENT 
OF  THESE  NATIONS.  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  PRESENT  A 
VERY  DIFFERENT  PICTURE.  ONLY  ABOUT  ONE  THIRD  OF  THEIR 
POPULATION  LIVE  IN  COUNTRIES  WITH  A FULLY  SATISFACTORY 
PERFORMANCE  IN  AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTION.  LATIN  AMERICA  IS, 
FOR  INSTANCE,  THE  ONLY  LESS  DEVELOPED  REGION  WHERE  FOOD 
INTAKE,  MEASURED  IN  CALORIES,  IS  EXPECTED  TO  BE  AT 
AN  ADEQUATE  LEVEL  IN  THE  YEAR  2000. 
ELSEWHERE,  PRODUCTION  IS  RISING  MORE  OR  LESS  AT  THE  SAME 
RATE  AS  THE  POPULATION  INCREASE,  LEAVING  LITTLE  ROOM 
FOR  REAL  IMPROVEMENT,  WHILE  IN  A TRAGICALLY  LARGE  NUMBER 
OF  CASES  IT  IS  FAILING  EVEN  TO  KEEP  UP  W1TH  THE  GROWTH 
IN  POPULATION.  AFRICA  HAS  BECOME  THE  MOST  STRIKING  EXAMPLE 
OF  THIS  KIND  OF  PRODUCTIO~ INSUFFICIENCY.  MOST  OF  THE 
52  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  WHERE  PER  CAPITA  FOOD  PRODUCTION 
HAS  ACTUALLY  FALLEN  IN  THE  PAST  TEN  YEARS  ARE  TO  BE  FOUND 
IN  AFRICA. - 39  -
IN  A NUMBER  OF  THIRD  WORLD  COUNTRIES,  IN  ASIA  AS  WELL 
AS  IN  LATIN  AMERICA,  AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTION  DID  RISE 
STRONGLY  THANKS  TO  THE  "GREEN  REVOLUTION".  THIS  HAS 
HELPED  TO  BOOST  OUTPUT,  ESPECIALLY  OF  CEREALS.  YET 
OVERALL,  THE  THIRD  WORLD  HAS  MORE  THAN  DOUBLED  ITS 
CEREALS  IMPORTS  SINCE  1970.  THESE  ARE  NOW  RUNNING  AT 
NEARLY  100  MILLION  TONNES  ANNUALLY.  FUTURE  PRIORITY 
MUST  BE  GIVEN  TO  RAISING  FOOD  OUTPUT  IN  THE  POOREST 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES.  FOR  THIS,THEY  WILL  REQUIRE  THE 
ASSISTANCE  OF  THE  EEC  AND  OTHER  INDUSTRIALISED  NATIONS 
TO  HELP  PROVIDE  MANY  OF  THE  BASIC  INPUTS  - FINANCE, 
FERTILISERS,  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWHOW,  MANAGEMENT  AND  MARKETING 
SKILLS,  IMPROVED  TRANSPORT  AND  STORAGE  FACILITIES,  ETC. - 40  -
Mo~e food  available,  but  not  for  everybody 
Pessimistic development  planners  in  the  1960's  predicted 
~ world  famine  by  1980.  This  has not occured,  but  there 
is  no  cause  for  complacency.  Although  the  world  presently 
produces  enough  food  to give  everybody  enough  to eat,  it 
is  badly distributed.  This  uneven  share-out of  available 
resources  occurs  at three  levels  .  between  the 
industrialised countries  and  the  Third  World,  among  the 
developing  count~ies themselves,  and  among  the different 
population  and  income  groups  within  them. 
It is  the  poorest countries  that have  fared  worst. 
Although  per  capita  food  production  has  fallen  in  more 
than  50 developing  countries  in  the  past decade,  some 
of  the  middle  income  countries  among  them  have  been  able 
to  increase  their  imports  to  make  up  the  shortfall.  This 
has  not  been  possible  for most  of  the  least developed 
countries where  available  hard  currency  resources  have 
to  be  split up  between  competing  claims  of  imported 
energy,  capital goods  and  food.  Food  aid continues to 
play  an  important  role  for  these countries,  but  the 
proportion of  their  needs  covered  by  this  source  has 
actually fallen.  According  to  FAO  statistics,  cereals 
food  aid  to  the  Least  Developed  Countries  has  remained 
stagnant at about.7.5 million  tonnes  since  1978/79. 
The  share  Gf  their  needs  covered  by  this  amount  fell 
from  23%  in  1978/79  to  18%  in  1981/82. 
This  imbalance  in  food  production  and  distribution  should 
not  be  allowed  to  mask  the considerable  progress  made 
in  recent years.  Output  has  increased  at  an  unprecedented 
rate,  thanks  to expanded  capacity  in  the  industrialised 
countries,  but  also as  a  result of  the  Green  Revolution 
in certain regions of  the  Third  World.  It has  been  of 
most  be.nefit  to Latin  American  and  South-East  Asian 
countries.  It has  enabled  the  countries of  the  Indian - 41  -
sub-Continent  just about  to match  food  output  to 
population growth.  Africa,  is  however,  at present 
losing  this  race.  While  per  capita  food  production 
in Africa  was  growing  at a  modest  0.1%  a  year  during 
the  1960's,  it actually declined  by  1.1%  a  year  during 
the  1970's.  (See  Table  I) 
TABLE  I 
GRCMI'H  RATES  OF  FOOD  OUTPUT  BY  MAJOR  WJRLD  REGIONS 
(EXCLUDING  CHIN.l\)·,  196o-80 
.Fbod  output 
Region  and  country group  'Ibtal  Per  capita 
196o-7o  197o-8o  196o-70  197o-8o 
' 
Developing  countries  2.9  2.8  0.4  0.4 
Low-incane  2.6  2.2  0.2  - 0.3 
Middle-income  3.2  3.3  o.  7  0.9 
Africa  2.6  1. 6  o. 1  - 1  . 1 
Middle  East  2.6  2.9  0.1  0.2 
Latin Arrerica  3.6  3.3  o. 1  0.6 
Southeast Asia  2.8  3.8  0.3  1.4 
South Asia  2.6  2.2  o. 1  0.0 
Southern Europe  3.2  3.5  1. 8  1.9 
Industrial market  economies  2.3  2.0  1. 3  1.1 
Nonrnarket  industrial economies  3.2  1. 7  2.2  0.9 
'Ibtal world  2.7  2.3  0.8  0.5 
source  :  FAO,  Agriculture  :  'Ibwards  2000. 
The  table  confirms  that  the  biggest  improvements  in  per 
qapita production  between  1960/70  and  1970/80 were 
achieved  by  South-East  Asia  and  Latin  America.  Only  in 
South  America  and  Southern  Europe,  where  some  countries - 42  -
can  scarcely  nowadays  be  considered  as developing 
did  per capita output  in  the  1970/80 period  exceed 
that of  the  advanced  market-economy countries. 
The  Green  Revolution  has  transformed  Third  World 
farming,  particularly  in wheat  and  rice growing  areas. 
Within little more  than  10  years,  nearly half  the 
world's  wheat  and  rice growing  areas  have  been 
converted  to  new  high-yield varieties. Coupled  with 
adequate  fertilisers  and  sufficient irrigation,  their 
yields can  be  double  or  triple that of  traditional 
varieties.  Progress  for  coarse grains  and  maize  have 
been  considerable  but  less spectacular. 
However,  while  the  Green  Revolution  has  benefitted 
millions of people  in  some  rural areas of  the  Third 
World,  it has  failed  to  bring  any  noteworthy  advantages 
to  an  even  larger  number  of  the developing  world's 
population.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons  for  this  : 
- the  new  improved  technology  was  inappropriate  for 
local conditions.  This  is particularly true  for 
Africa. 
- prices  and  other  incentives offered  to  farmers 
were  inadequate 
- transport or  marketing  structures were  deficient 
- natural rainfall,  irrigation or  flood  control  was 
not  available 
- there  were  inadequate  resources  for  research  and 
training. 
In  more  general  terms,  agriculture  suffered  because 
development  priorities were  placed elsewhere. 
Industrialisation and  large-scale  infrastructure 
projects were often preferred over  food  production 
schemes.  Even  within  the  agricultural sector, - 43  -
governments  often concentrated  on  export crops  which 
earned  hard  currency  rather  than  boosting  food 
production  for  local consumption. 
This  approach,  widely  backed  by  development  strategists 
in  the  1960's,  has  recently come  in  for  considerable 
criticism.  It is  now  generally accepted  that Third 
World  governments  have  no  real choice between  industrialisation 
and  the expansion of the agricultural sector. The  two  must  grow  in 
parallel.  The  princ~pal activity of two  thirds of the population 
of the  Third  World  (agriculture)  cannot  be  neglected 
if anything  approaching  balanced  development  is  to  be 
attained.  Yet  this  is often what  has  happened.  The 
balance of  interests  between  producers  and  consumers 
is the central  issue of  agricultural policy.  But 
Third  World  planners  have  often,  in  the  interests of 
industrialisation or  of  their  urban  consumers,  or 
both,  applied  economic,  fiscal  and  monetary policies 
that discriminated  against domestic  farmers  and 
epcouraged  cheap  imports  from  outside,  even  at the 
expense of  long-term changes  in consumers  eating habits. 
Keeping  food  cheap  for  consumers,  through  inadequate 
prices paid  to domestic  producers  or  through  cheap 
imports  via  an  ov~rvalued currency,  has  proved  a  sho~t­
sighted policy.  Incentives  to  farmers  to  invest  and 
produce  is  the  prime  and  universal  stimulus  for 
agricultural growth. 
The  effects of  the  poor  response of  food  production  in 
many  developing  countries  shows  up  clearly in  interna-
tional  trade  in agricultural products.  Developed 
countries  have  become  more  dominant  in  exports  while  the 
positive trade balance  in agriculture of developing 
countries  has  been  eroded  as  imports  rose  more  rapidly 
than  exports.  At  the  same  time,  international assistance 
for  agricultural development  in  the  Third  World  has 
remained  inadequate. - 44  -
The  overall picture of  world  food  and  agricultural 
production  and  consumption  is summed  up  in  Table  II. 
The  advanced  countries dominate  world  agricultural 
output,  their  workers  are  ten  times  more  productive 
than  those of the  Third  World,  they  have  seven  times 
more  land  than  their counterparts  in  the  developing 
countries  and  they  use  4.5  times  more  fertiliser. 
The  result is that people  in  the  industrialised 
countries  have  a  daily  food  intake,  measured  in calories, 
which  is  50%  higher  than  the  Third  World  average. 
TABLE  II 
NORI'H-SOO'IH  AGRICUL'IURAL  CCMPARISCN 
Percent 
of world  population 
Percent of world 
agricultural production 
production per 
agricultural worker  ($  1975) 
Arable  land per 
agricultural worker  (ha) 
Fertilizer use 
(kg/ha)  of agricultural land 
Tbtal daily food 
consumption  (calories) 
Numbers  of seriously 
Developing 
countries 
67 
38 
550 
1,  3 
9 
2  180 
undernourished  (millions)  435 
Source ·:  FAO,  Agriculture  Tbwards  2000. 
Developed 
countries 
33 
62 
5  220 
8,9 
40 
3  315 (7) 
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~ood trade  The  Third  World  at a  disadvantage 
Although  the  Third  World  is increasingly dependent  on 
the  industrialised countries  to make  up  the shortfall 
in  their  own  food  production,  developing countries 
remain  important exporters of  agricultural  products. 
They  export  bananas,  beef,  coffee,  cocoa,  citrus fruits, 
sugar,  tea,  cotton,  jute,  rubber,  etc.  Their  share 
of world  exports  exceeds  90%  for  cocoa,  coffee, 
tea,  rubber  and  tropical  timber. 
Yet  their overall food  balance  has  been  in deficit since 
1974.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  This  first  is 
the  production shortfall  in  the majority of countries 
already discussed  above.  The  second  is  the  fact  that 
the  price paid  on  world  markets  for  their  export  items 
has  actually fallen,  while  the  cost of  the  basic cereals 
which  they  import  has  continued  to  rise. 
Table  III  shows  that without  exception  there were  sharp 
falls  in  the  prices paid  for  all agricultural export 
products  from  the  Third  World  in  1981  as  compared  with 
1980.  These  ranged  from  10%  for  tea  to  just over 
40%  for  sugar.  So  long  as  world  demand  remains  depressed, 
there  is little prospect of  a  durable  turnround  in  most 
of  these prices.  The  situation is quite different  for 
basic cereals,  whose  prices have  remained  steady or 
have  actually  increased  (as  in  the  case of  rice). - 46  -
TABLE  III 
PRICE VARIATIONS  AND  CYl'HER  DATA  00  SEI.EX:::TED  PRIMARY  a::M{)DITIES 
( 1981) 
Price variation  Dev.  countr •  share  TOtal  world  exports 
in  1981  in.exports and  in  1980 
compared  to pre- imJ:X)rts  in 1980  (in billions of 
vious year  (%)  (%)  us  $) 
Main  exports of erimar~ 
eroducts by develoeing 
countries 
Cocoa  ·- 20.1  100  3.0 
Coffee  - 17.4  95  12.6 
Rubber  - 22.9  97  4.4 
Sugar  - 40.8  45  14.4 
Tea  - 9.6  92  1. 9 
TObacco  - 11.0  58  3.9 
Copper  - 20.2  64  11.2 
Tin  - 15.6  85  3. 1 
~-bod  (Tropical)  - 25.1  93  4.0 
Main  imJ:X)r ts of er  imar~ 
eroducts  b~ develoein9 
countries 
Maize  4.4  38  13.4 
Rice  11.3  77  5.4 
Wheat  2.9  56  18.7 
Source  World  Bank,  Annual  Report  1982. 
In  1982,  cereal~ prices. also  began  to fall,  but  in 
much  smaller  propor~ions compared  with  the continued 
slide  in  tropical agricultural products.  World  production 
for  coffee is currently  running  12%  ahead  of demand, 
while  the  corresponding  surplus  for  sugar  is  9%  and  for 
cocoa  6%.  The  world  surplus  for  cereals  in  1982  was 
little more  than  2%  of consumption. - 47  - ·. 
The  effects of  the  recession  and  of  the  fall  in  food 
commodity  prices are  reflected  in Table  IV.  It shows 
clearly that while  industrialised countries  were  able 
to cut their  food  bill in  1981  (by  5%)  those of  the 
developing countries  and  the centrally planned  economies 
continued  to rise. 
TABLE  IV 
IMPORTS  OF  EOODS'IUFFS  BY  MAIN  AREAS,  1979-1981 
(Billion Dollars  and  percentages) 
Percentage change 
Destination  1979  over previous year 
Billion 
Dollars  1980  1981  -- --
-
Industrial countries  127  + 7  - 5 
Developing countries  44  +29  + 7 
Eastern trading area  22  +25  +12 
Source  GATT,  International Trade  - 1981-1982. 
Another  negative  aspect of  trade  in  agricultural  raw 
materials  for  the  developing  countries  is  that  their 
exports  are  handled  by  a  very  small  number  of multi-
national corporations,  headquartered  in  the  United  States 
or  Western  Europe'.  'lhese groups  can  often exercise 
significant market  power  due  to  the  sheer  size of  their 
operations.  These  firms  are organised  in  such  a  way 
that little data  is available to quantify  the extent of 
this  power.  But  they clearly have  an  important  role  to 
play  in determining  prices  and  trade  flows. - 48  -
Table  V presents estimates of  the concentration of 
world  trade in  a  number  of commodities  in  the  hands  of 
a  very  small  number  of  transnational  corporations  in 
the  late  1970's.  In  most  cases,  three or  four  firms 
accounted  for  more  that  75%  of  international  trade 
in several  individual commodities.  Often  individual 
firms  were  involved  in  trading  several of  the  commodities 
listed on  the  table. 
TABLE  V 
(..'()1\CENI'RATION  OF  TRADE  BY  TRANSNATIONAL 
FIRMS  DURING  THE  LATE-1970's 
Share of 'NOrld  Number  of 
Corrm:x:U ty  Trade  firms 
%  involved 
(volume) 
Cereals/soybeans  85  - 90  6 
Sugar  60- 65  4 
r.blasses  95  3 
Bananas  80  3 
Coffee  85  - 90  6 
Cocoa  85  5 
Tea  85  3 
Tobacco  85  - 90  4 
Cotton  85  - 90  8 
-
Source  OECD  Study on  Problems  of Agricultural Trade 
(Paris,  1982J. 
The  question may  also  be  asked  as  to whether  these  firms, 
together  with  agro-business multinationals  installed  in 
the  developing countries,  are  not  also contributing  to 
the  food  supply problems  for  these  very countries. 
By  concentrating  their activities on export  crops, 
do  they  encourage  the  neglect of  the  production 
of  foodstuffs  for  the  local market  ? - 49  -
Another  aspect of world  trade  in  foodstuffs  needs 
closer  analysis.  It is  the  increasingly dominant 
position occupied  by  the  industrialised countries, 
particularly the  United  States  and  the  EEC.  Between them, 
these  two  now  provide  40%  of  food  products  imported 
by  the  Third  World,  with  the  US  accounting  for  24% 
and  the  Community  16%.  The  proportion of  the  EEC's 
agricultural exports going  to the  Third  World  increased 
from  31%  to  42%  in  the  five  years  from  1973  to  1978. 
The  biggest  expansion  was  to  the  Middle  East. 
Whilst  the  United  States  and  the  Community  have  expanded 
their  food  sales to the  Third  World,  they  are  accused  of 
being  protectionist against agricultural goods  exported 
by  the  developing countries.  In  particular,  the  EEC  is 
c·harged  with  maintaining  a  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
{CAP)  aimed  at high-cost  self-sufficie~cy at the  expense 
of cheaper  imports  from  outside.  Its subsidised  surplus 
disposal operations  are  said  to depress  world  market 
prices. 
In  its defense,  the  Community  argu,es  {  1)  that  78%  of  its 
agricultural  exports  to  the  Third  World  are of  products 
for  which  the  developing  countries  are  in deficit. 
The  Community  helps  to offset  the  food  shortfall  in  these 
countries  resulting  from  increased  demand,  especially  in 
the  middle  income  countries,  the  rapid  pace  of  urbanisation 
in all developing  countries  and  the deterioration of  the 
environment.  The  remaining  22%  of  the  Community's 
agricultutal exports consists of  products  for  which  the 
developing countries are  net exporters.  There  is therefore 
direct competition  between  EEC  products  and  those of  the 
Third  World.  The  main  products  concerned  are  sugar,  for 
which  the  Community  has  been  a  traditional net exporter, 
and  beef  and  veal,  for  which  it has  been  a  net  exporter 
(1)  In  a  study  by  the  EEC  Commission  on  the  impact  of  the 
CAP  on  the Third  World  {Sec  {82)  1223),  14  July  1982. - so  -
since  1979/80.  The  Community  has  tried  to respond  to some 
of  the  criticisms  leveled  against  its sugar  export policy 
by  stockpiling several million  tonnes  instead 
of  unloading  them  on  the world  market. 
While  there  is little doubt  that subsidised  EEC  exports 
of cereals, dairy products and  meat  help cover  the irranediate 
food  shortages of  the developing  countries,  their  longer 
term effects  ~re less positive.  By  offering  these 
products  at cheap  (subsidised )  prices,  the  Community  risks 
in  the  recipient country  removing  the vital element of 
incentive  necessary  to  stimulate  local production  as  well 
as  bringing  about  lasting  changes  in preferences  for  foods 
which  cannot  be locally produced. 
Cereals  are  a  special case 
Cereals  are  the  basi-c  food  for  most  of mankind.  As  such, 
they may  hold  the  key  to world  food  security.  But  the 
slow  growth  of Third  World  cereals production  and  their 
rapidly expanding  imports  is creating  a  situation of 
excessive dependence.  As  can  be  seen  from  Table  VI, 
output  in  the developing  countries  has  risen  by  20%  in 
the  past  ten  years,  while  imports  are  up  by  120%  during 
the  same  period.  EEC  experts estimate  that if present 
trends  continue,  Third  World  cereals imports  are set to double 
again  from  the present  level of nearly  100 million  tonnes 
a  year  to  200 million  by  the  year  2000. 220 
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TABLE  VI 
CEREAL  PRODUCriON  AND  IMPORTS  OF  DE.VELOPING  COUNTRIES ( 1 ) 
Percentage - 1970/71  = 100 
1971172  1972173  11174175  197SI76  1977178'  .h·''18JIIIN  ·.  ·•··  18~,.,  .. p·::·""· ~--"'""11 
.  . ..  ,  :/~·~  ..  ;,~.::. ·.:·  ..  ~~~· {· 
( 1)  Cereals canprise wheat,  rice in milled equivalent and 
coarse grains. 
Source  FAD,  'Ihe  Dimension of Needs. - 52  -
Besides  the  growing  degree of  import  dependence,  the 
present situation gives  several causes  for  concern  : 
1.  While  some  Third  World  countries,  such  as  the oil 
exporters,  can  pay  for  large cereals  imports,  most 
of  the  rest have  serious  balance of  payments  problems 
wich  limit their capacity to  import  in order  to 
satisfy needs. 
2.  As  the  amount  of  imports  has  risen  the  proportion 
represented  by  food  aid  shipments  has  fallen 
considerably.  In  1970/71  when  developing countries 
imported  43  million  tonnes  of cereals,  food  aid 
accounted  for  30%  of  the  total.  Now  that  imports  are 
running  at nearly  100 million  tonnes  food  aid  makes 
up  only  10%  of  the overall total,  although  the  figure 
is  higher  {18%)  for  the least developed  countries. 
3.  The  poor€st countries  are  among  those  where  the 
increase  in  imports  has  shown  the  steepest rise. 
4.  The  cereals bill of  the  developing  countries  is  now 
the  equivalent of  two-thirds of  the official 
development  assistance  from  all sources. 
Although  they have  increased  imports,  the  developing 
countries  have  not  increased  their  share of world 
cereal stocks,  a  vital element  in world  food  security. 
These  are  heavily concentrated  in  North  America  and 
several other  developed  countries.  Too  few  Third  World. 
states have  developed  food  security policies  and  external 
financial  assistance  for  the  creation of  stocks  has  been 
inadequate.  This  is  an  important  aspect of  the  problem 
since  the  effectiveness of  stocks  depends  not only  on 
their  volume  but  also on  their availability at  the  right 
time  in  the  right place. 
The  FAO  considers  a  minimum  security level of cereals 
stocks  to  be  17%  of  annual  world  consumption.  This 
proportion fell  to  13%  during  the  shortage  years of  1973/74. (8) 
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Although  since  then  it has  largely been  above  the 
minimum  level  (see  Table VII),  it fell  to  15%  in 
1980/81  and  may  well  drop  below  the critical  17% 
level  again  during  the  present decade. 
TABLE  VII 
WJRI.D  CERFALS  S'IOCKS 
1978/79  1979/80  1980/81  1981/82 
estim. 
1982/83 
forecast 
( ............... millions tons ............ ) 
Rice  (milled)  43  42  41  43  42 
Wheat  117  103  95  101  109 
Coarse grains  114  110  93  128  149 
All cereals  274  255  229  271  300  -----------
Developing countries  96  97  96  96  98 
Developed  countries  177  158  134  175  202 
Stocks as % of world cereal  ( ................. percent ................ ) 
consumption  19  18  15  18 
Source  FAO,  Food Outlook  (September  1982) • 
Why  should  world  cereals  trade  be  increasingly 
dominated  by  the  western  industrialised count(ies, 
particularly the  United  States  and  Canada  ? 
19 
One  reason  is of course  that  the  advanced  countries,  where 
much  of  the  research  was  carried out,  were  among  the 
first  to benefit  from  the Green  Revolution. - 54  -
These  countries were  also the  ones  best  able  to  invest  in 
new  varieties,  in modern  production  methods  and  in  more 
intensive  use  of fertilisers  and  other  !nputs.  But 
they  were  also able  to  respond  quickly  to changing  food 
consumption  patterns.  Cereals production  was  stimulated 
less  by  the  demand  for  direct human  consumption  but 
rather  by  the  need  for  feed  grains  for  livestock.  This 
reflected  the  rising  demand,  paiticularly in  the 
industrialised countries  for  high  value  products  such 
as  meat,  poultry  and  dairy produce.  More  than  600 million 
tonnes of cereals  are  fed  to  animals  every year. 
~lthough it is sometimes  argued  that this  amount  of 
grain could  feed  2.5  billion people,  more  than  twice 
the  number  of the world's  population  who  do  not get 
enough  to eat,  the  problem  is not  a  simple one.  For  the 
Third  World  to  be  able  to  buy  these cereals would  require 
a  massive  transfer of  purchasing  power  from  the  rich  to 
the  poor  countries.  In  addition,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
long  term effects of  imports  on  this scale would 
certainly put paid  to efforts  by  the  poor  countries  to 
develop  their  own  food  production. 
At  the  beginning of  the  1970's,  the  western  industri-
alised countries  accounted  for  70%  of  world  cereals 
exports;  by  1980  the  figure  had  risen  to  80%  (90%  for 
wheat,  80%  for  coarse grains  and  33%  for  rice). 
There  was  an  increasing  concentration  in  North  America 
although  the  EEC  became  a  significant exporter  at  the 
end  of  the  1970's. - 55  -
Table  VIII  shows  the  spectacular  rise  in  net  exports 
of  the  United  States  and  Canada.  Despite  rising 
exports,  the  European  Community  remained  a  net 
importer  because of  its need  for  feed  grains  from 
abroad  (particularly  from  the  US)  • 
TABLE  VIII 
HOW  THE  PATTERN  OF  GRAIN  EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS  HAS  CHANGED 
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Lester  Brown,  Building  a  Sustainable  Society. - 56  -
Food  aid 
Given  the  growing  needs  of  the  poorest countries who 
cannot  pay  for  food,  energy  and  other  essential  imports, 
food  aid will continue  to  be  an  essential  facet  of  world 
development  strategies  for  a  long  time  to  come.  It has 
come  under  fire  because  of  its demobilising effect on 
governments  and  farmers  in  recipient countries  and 
because  it is  sometimes  subject  to "political" 
conditions  imposed  by  the  donor  country.  But  provided 
governments  receiving  food  aid  make  it available  locally 
at reasonable prices  and  ensure  its fair distribution 
its disruptive effects can  be  kept  to  a  minimum. 
There  is  no  feasable  alternative at  the  moment.  Given 
rising  food  import  requirements  among  the developing 
countries  and  their  limited capacity  to  import  it on 
commercial  terms,  food  aid  needs  will rise considerably 
in  the  1980's.  This  will  be  the  case  even  if there  are 
considerable  improvements  in  Third  World  production 
leve-ls.  But  food  aid  in cereals,  for  instance,  has  been 
stagnant  for  the  past  five  years,  fluctuating  between 
8.5 million  tonnes  and  9.5 million  tonnes  annually. 
Three  quarters of  this  amount  goes  to  the  least developed 
countries,  but  as  their  needs  rise,  the  proportion of 
their  imports covered  by  food  aid  has  fallen  (from  24% 
in  1977/78  to  18%  in  1981/82).  The  European 
Community  is the  second  biggest donor  of cereals  after 
the  United  States.  The  EEC  is also  a  major  donor  of  food 
aid  in  the  form  of dairy  products  (skimmed  milk  powder 
and  butter).  In  1980 it granted  150,000  tonnes  of milk 
powder  and  45,000  tonnes  of butteroil  in  aid.  India  and 
Egypt  were  among  the  principal beneficiaries. - 57  -
Food  aid  is however  at best  a  palliative.  The 
industrialised countries  need  to maintain  and 
increase  their overall  financial  support  aimed  at 
boosting  Third  World  agricultural production. 
In  real  terms official assistance  to agriculture 
doubled  in  the  period  1973/78  but  has  not  moved  up 
significantly from  the  annual  rate of  10 billion 
Dollars  reached  at  the  end  of this period. 
The  improvement  in  local  food  production  requires  a 
collective effort.  Third World  governments  should 
through  policy measures  redress  the  imbalance  between 
industrialisation on  the  one  hand  and  agricultural  and 
rural development  on  the other. 
';I'hey  should  also provide  the  necessary 
incentives  to  farmers  in  the  form  of  adequate  prices 
for  their  products  while  ensuring  the  availability of 
vital  inputs  as  well  as  improving  irrigation,transport, 
storage  and  marketing  facilities. 
A growing  number  of developing  countries  are  trying  to 
bring  these  elements  together  in  a  national  food 
strategy. 
Industrialised countries can  support  these efforts 
a  number  of  ways 
by  helping  to  adapt  their  own  advances  in  research 
and  technology  to  local conditions.  This  has  been 
a  particular  problem  for  Africa. 
by  contributing  to  investments  in  machinery  and 
agricultural  infrastructure. 
by  training  programmes  to  increase  the  level of 
human  skills. 
by  providing  food  aid  on  terms  that  would  permit 
recipient countries  to  integrate it into their 
national strategies. 
by  cooperating directly with countries  in  the 
implementation of  their national strategies.  The 
EEC  is already doing  this with  several African 
state~,  such  as  Mali,  Zambia,  Kenya  and  Rwanda. - 58  -
INTERDEPENDENCE 
THE  NORTH  AND  THE  SOUTH  OF  THE  PLANET  HAVE  LONG  BEEN 
INTERDEPENDENT.  RAW  MATERIALS  OF  THE  SOUTH  WERE  NEEDED 
BY  THE  INDUSTRIES  OF  THE  NORTH.  THE  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT 
OF  THE  SOUTH  REQUIRED  MANUFACTURED  PRODUCTS,  CAPITAL  AND 
KNOW-HOW  FROM  THE  ADVANCED  COUNTRIES.  BUT  THIS  STATE 
OF  INTERDEPENDENCE  HAS  BEEN  CONTAINED  IN  THE 
GLOBAL  ECONOMIC  FRAMEWORK  SET  BY  THE  INDUSTRIALISED 
COUNTRIES, 
IT  TOOK  THE  FIRST  OIL  SHOCK  OF  1973/74  TO  PROVOKE  A 
BREACH  IN  THIS  ONE-SIDED  DOMINATION. 
THE  RESULT  WAS  THE  FIRST  SERIOUS  ATTEMPT  TO  SEE  WHETHER 
NORTH-SOUTH  RELATIONS  COULD  BE  PUT  ON  A MORE  STABLE 
AND  EQUITABLE  BASIS.  PROGRESS  TO  DATE  HAS  BEEN 
DISAPPOINTING.  YET,  FOR  INSTANCE,  BOTH  SIDES  HAVE  A 
COMMON  INTEREST  IN  OBTAINING,  AND  SUPPLYING,  ENERGY  AND 
RAW  MATERIALS  IN  SUFFICIENT  QUANTITIES  AND  AT  REASONABLE 
PRICES,  BUT  THIS  KIND  OF  STABILITY  ENTAILS  FAIR  DEALS 
FOR  BOTH  CONSUMERS  AND  PRODUCERS  OF  THESE  PRIMARY 
PRODUCTS  WHICH  ARE  AT  THE  HEART  OF  NORTH-SOUTH  INTER-
DEPENDENCE.  EXPORTERS  AND  INVESTORS  NEED  STABLE  PRICES, 
OR  AT  LEAST  STABLE  INCOMES,  THE  INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES 
HAVE  A DIRECT  INTEREST  IN  RAISING  THE  PURCHASING  POWER 
OF  THE  THIRD  WORLD•  THESE  NATIONS  ARE  ALREADY  THE 
BIGGEST  MARKET  FOR  CAPITAL  GOODS  AND  FOOD  PRODUCTS 
EXPORTED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY. 
INTERDEPENDENCE  CAN  MEAN  COOPERATION,  BUT  IT  CAN  ALSO 
MEAN  RIVALRY.  IF  THE  FRUITS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION  CANNOT  BE  SHARED  EACH  SIDE  WILL  TEND  TO 
TURN  AWAY  FROM  THE  OTHER.  INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES 
HAVE  CUT  INVESTMENTS  IN  THE  THIRD  WORLD  BECAUSE  OF  A 
CONFLICT  OVER  HOW  PROFITS  SHOULD  BE  SHARED.  IN  OTHER 
SECTORS,  IT  IS  THE  THIRD  WORLD  THAT  FEELS  UNFAIRLY 
TREATED  BY  THE  ADVANCED  NATIONS,  IT  IS  DISSATISFIED - 59  -
WITH  THE  TERMS  OF  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFERS  AND  THE  CONTINUED 
DOMINATION  BY  THE  NORTH  OF  TRADING  AND  RAW  MATERIAL 
ARRANGEMENTS, 
THIS  IS  NOT  TO  SAY  THAT  INTERDEPENDENCE  SHOULD  BE 
REGARDED  AS  A SUBSTITUTE  FOR  SELF-RELIANCE.  THE  TWO 
ARE  COMPLEMENTARY.  MORE  RELIANCE  ON  ONE'S  OWN 
RESOURCES  REDUCES  EXCESSIVE  DEPENDENCE,  THUS,  THE 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  TECHNOLOGICAL  EXCHANGES  AND  PREFERENTIAL 
TRADING  ARRANGEMENTS  WITHIN  THE  THIRD  WORLD  (SOUTH-
SOUTH  COOPERATION)  ARE  POSITIVE  STEPS  TOWARDS  A WIDER 
AND  MORE  UNIVERSAL  SYSTEM  OF  COOPERATION.  IT  IS  WHEN 
NORTH  AND  SOUTH  FOLLOW  POLICIES  THAT  ARE  TOO  INWARD-
LOOKING  THAT  THE  RISK  OF  THE  FURTHER  WASTE  OF  ALREADY 
SCARCE  RESOURCES  INCREASES.  TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  THE 
TWO  GROUPS  WOULD  THEN  BECOME  MORE  COSTLY  AND  LESS 
RELIABLE. 
SUCH  A TREND  WOULD  UNDERMINE  THE  BASIS  FOR  LONG-TERM 
COOPERATION  TO  SOLVE  THE  WORLD'S  BIGGEST  PROBLEMS  -
POVERTY,  HUNGER,  THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ENVIRONMENT. 
UNTIL  NOW,  THE  MAJORITY  OF  PROPOSALS  THE  THIRD  WORLD 
HAS  PUT  FORWARD,  WHATEVER  THEIR  TECHNICAL  MERITS, 
HAVE  HAD  ONE  THING  IN  COMMON  :  A COMMITMENT  TO 
INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION,  INEVITABLY  THE  CURRENT 
RECESSION  HAS  LOWERED  EXPECTATIONS,  BUT  THE  CASE  FOR 
WORKING  TOGETHER  TO  SEEK  A MORE  REALISTIC  BASIS  FOR 
COOPERATION  IN  LINE  WITH  THE  MORE  DIFFICULT  WORLD 
ENVIRONMENT  OF  THE  1980's  REMAINS  A STRONG  ONE, - 60  -
Interdependence  and  the North-South  Dialogue 
Reduced  to its simplest expression,  interdependence 
means  that  the  industrialised countries  need  the  raw 
materials  found  in  the  Third  World,  which,  in  turn, 
needs  the  technical products,  human  skills and 
financial  resources concentrated  in  the  advanced 
countries.  But  interdependence  also means  much  more. 
In  a  world  where  the  economy  has  been  internationalised, 
where  communications  have  shrunk  distances,  developments 
in  one  region  have  an  impact  on  the  rest.  Although 
self-reliance is  a  healthy  instinct,  purely local 
solutions  are  sometimes difficult to  apply.  Increasingly, 
the  issues of energy,  trade,  finance,  the  protection of 
the  environement  have  to  be  handled  in  a  global context. 
Economic  growth  in  one  country or  region  is partly 
dependent  on  the  performance  of others.  The  South 
cannot  grow  without  the  North,  while  the  North  depends 
on  a  more  developed  South  if it is  to continue  to  prosper. 
Each  is  now  feeling  the  impact of  the current  recession 
(see  Table  I). 
TABLE  I 
NORrH  & SOUTH  GNP  GROV'mi  1970-1981 
1970/77  1978  1979  1980  1981 
All developing countries 
GNP  total  5.8  5.9  4.8  5.0  2.2 
(per  capita)  (3. 5)  (3.8)  (2.8)  (3.0)  (0. 2) 
Industrialised countries 
GNP  total  3.4  4.0  3.3  1. 2  1.  3 
(per  capita)  (2. 5)  (3.4)  (2.6)  (0.6)  (0. 7) 
Source  World  Bank,Annual  Report  1982. - 61  -
While  this  state of  interdependence  has  existed 
since colonial  times,  awareness  of  it has  increased 
since  the  1960's.  There  is  now  a  clearer  realisation 
of  these  common  problems  and  common  constraints. 
The  world's  resources  are,  after all, finite.  Scarce 
resources,  be  they  of  energy,  food,  minerals  or  just 
breatheable air  and  drinkable water,  need  to  be 
managed  in  common. 
But  interdependence  is  sometimes  misunderstood. 
The  term  has  come  to  be  treated  by  some  as  shorthand 
for  unilateral concessions  by  the  North  in  favour  of 
the  Third  World.  Some  developing  countries  have  tended 
to consider  part of  their developmental  problems  as 
solvable only  in  the  North-South  framework  rather  than 
first applying  internal  adjustment  measures  at  home. 
As  world  trade  slows  down,  the  rate of  integration of 
the  developing  countries,  particularly the poorest 
among  them,  into  the  global  economy  will  also  slow. 
International efforts must  also  aim  therefore  at 
reinforcing  the  self-reliance of  developing  countries  -
individually  and  collectively - in  the difficult years 
ahead. 
It took  the  first oil price rises  imposed  by  the  OPEC 
members  in  1973/74  to  bring  the  concept of  inter-
dependence  into sharp  focus.  Whereas  previously  the 
industrialised countries  that controlled  the  world 
trading  and  production  system  had  been  reluctant  to 
recognise  the  extent of world  interdependence,  the 
oil shock  gave  them  no  choice.  For  the  first  time, 
a  group  a  Third  World  countries  succeeded  in  breaking 
their domination. 
As  a  direct result,  the  mechanism  was  created  for  a 
global  North-South  dialogue  which  culminated  in  the 
unsuccessful  Conference  on  International  Economic 
Cooperation  (CIEC)  which  took  place  in  Paris  between 
December  1975  and  June  1977.  The  oil weapon  was  used 
to  force  the  industrialised countries  to  the  negotiating - 62 
table to examine  the demands  of the Third World,  some  of 
which  had  been  formulated  20  years  previously at the 
Bandung  Conference.  At  the  conference,  the  North 
wanted  assurances  on  energy  supplies  and  prices,  the 
South  trading mechanisms  that  took  account of  their 
raw  material exports,  the cancellation or  rescheduling 
of debts  and  access  to  industrialised countries' 
technology. 
Neither  side got  much  of  what  it wanted.  The  main 
reason  for  the  failure of  the dialogue  has  been  the 
ambiguity  on  the part of North  and  South,  but 
particularly by  the  industrialised countries,  as  to 
whether  the  dialogue  should  be  approached  in  a  spirit 
of confrontation or  cooperation.  Interdependence  does 
not  automatically point  to solidarity;  it can  sometimes 
have  the  opposite effect  as  each  side tries to maximise 
its advantages  over  the  other. 
Efforts  to restart the global North-South  dialogue  in 
recent years  have  yielded  nothing.  One  cause  has  been 
the  attitude of  the  United  States.  The  Reagan 
administration considers  the best policy  for  the 
developing countries  is still to follow the pattern of 
progressive  integration  into the  world  market. 
In  addition,if energy problems  are  a  barometer  of 
North-South  relations,  pressure  has  fallen considerably. 
Energy-saving measures  in  the  industrialised countries, 
coupled  with  the drop  in  demand  resulting  from  the 
recession,  and  the  development  of  non-OPEC  sources 
have  combined  to change  the  balance  on  the  world 
energy market.  While  OPEC  production still represented 
51%  of output  in  1977,  this  figure  had  fallen  to  36% 
of  a  smaller  total output  by  1982.  The  risk  of  a 
third oil shock, though  still possible,  seems  to 
have  receded  for  the  time  being. - 63  -
However,  not all industrialised countries  share  the 
u.s.  approach.  The  European  Community  is  far  more 
dependent  on  outside  sources  of  energy  products  and 
other  raw materials  than  the  United  States.  It also 
retains  an  element  of post-colonial  responsibilities 
(and  privileged  trade  relations)  with  regard  to  former 
dependent territories of  member  states.  It tends, 
therefore,  to give  a  higher  priority than  the  Americans 
to  relaunching  negotiations with  the  developing  countries. 
Failing  agreement  among  the  advanced  nations  as  a  group, 
the  Community  may  move  ahead  on  its own  to consolidate 
links  in  those  areas of North-South  cooperation  in  which 
it is particularly interested. 
The  dynamic  elements  of  interdependence  as  they  manifest 
themselves  in trade  between  North  and  South,  in  the 
industrialisation process of  the  Third  World  and  in  the 
financial  relations  between  rich  and  poor  are  each dealt 
with  separately  in  the  following  chapters of  this 
document.  Here  we  will  look  at  the  fundamental 
determining  factors  in North-South  relations,  energy 
and  raw  materials. 
Energy 
Energy  is  a  problem  for  rich  and  poor  alike.  The 
majority of  the  world's  nations,  be  they  to  the  North 
or  South of  the planet,  depend  on  imports  to  cover  part 
(very often  the  major  part)  of  their energy  requirements. 
The  principal energy  source  is oil,  although  its 
proportion  in  total consumption  is  scheduled  to diminish 
as  consumers  increase conservation  measures  and  diversify 
to other  sources.  But oil is still set to dominate  the 
energy market  for  the  foreseeable  future. 
Although  the  advanced  countries  account  for  85%  of  world 
oil consumption  and  the  Third  World  only  15%,  oil 
represents  two-thirds  of  primary  energy  used  by  the - 64  -
developing countries,  a  higher  proportion  than  in  the 
industrialised countries.  Although  starting  from  a 
much  lower  base,  developing countries  have  been 
increasing  their  imports  of oil at  a  faster  pace  in 
recent years  than  the  advanced  countries.  Needless 
to  say  they still have  a  long  way  to  go.  One  American 
uses  as  much  commercial  energy  as  two  Germans,  three 
Swiss  or  Japanese,  six  Yugoslavs,  nine  Mexicans  or 
Cubans,  16  Chinese,  19  Malaysians,  53  Indians or 
Indonesians,  109  Sri  Lankans,  438  Malians,  or  1072 
Nepalese.  ( 1) 
In  many  ways,  oil is  the  ideal  fuel  for  the developing 
countries.  In  traditional on-shore  areas it is cheap 
to produce,  relatively cheap  to  transport  and  extremely 
simple  to utilise.  But  it is  also  by  far  the  most 
internationally traded  energy  source  and  as  such  highly 
sensitive  to global  imbalances  in  supply  and  demand. 
However,  high oil prices  have  helped  choke  off demand 
while  encouraging  the  development  of oil fields  in 
hitherto unexploited  regions.  Since  the  second oil 
shock  of  1979/80 which  followed  the  revolution  in  Iran, 
the  balance  in  the oil market  has  started  to  swing  back 
in  favour  of consumers.  The  turn-round  has  helped 
essentially the  industrialised countries  who  have  been 
able  to maintain  their  exports of  manufactured  goods 
and  thereby  reduce  their oil deficits.  The  oil deficits 
of  the  three main  industrialised  regions,  the  United 
States,  the EEC  and  Japan  totalled 220  billion Dollars in 1980, 
but  this was  nearly offset by  their  combined  surplus  in 
manufactured  goods  of  about  210  billion Dollars. 
The  EEC  alone  had  a  manufacturing  surplus with  the  OPEC 
countries of  40  billion. 
(1)  Figures  taken  from  :  North-South  :  A Programme  for 
Survival  ("The  Brandt  Report");Pan  Books  (London,  1980). - 65  -
The  oil-importing  developing  countries,  apart  from 
a  handful of NIC's,  do  not  have  this possibility of 
paying  their oil bill with  exports of manufactures. 
In  fact,  as  Table  II  shows,  their oil deficit is 
in  fact  less  than  20%  of their deficit  in manufactured 
goods.  They  are ill equipped,  with  only their  raw 
materials  as principal  resource,  to offset the cost of 
imported oil and  manufactured  goods,  many  of  them 
capital equipment  for  their development  programmes. 
Their  payments  surpluses  on  foodstuffs  and  industrial 
raw  materials  have  increased  far  more  slowly  than  their 
deficits for  the other  two  categories.  For  over 
20  developing countries,  energy  imports  now  account 
for  more  than  30%  of  the  value  of  their overall exports. 
TABLE  II 
TRADE  BA.IANCES  OF  NON-QIL  DE.'VEWPING  COUNTRIES,  BY  ~DITY  GROUP 
(In billions of US  Dollars) 
1965  1970  1975  1979 
'IDI'AL  ......................  - 6.3  -11.7  -45.7  -66.6 
Primary oammodities,  excl. 
Fuels  ......................  10.0  14.5  22.6  35.8 
Foodstuffs ..................  4.5  6.2  10.8  18.9 
Industrial raw  materials ....  5.5  8.3  11.8  16.9 
Fuels ..........................  - 1.0  - 1.8  -10.4  -19.1 
Manufactures ...................  -15.3  -24.4  -57.9  -83.3 
Source  :  UNCTAD,  Trade  and  Development  Report,  1981. 
Whenever  the oil market  is  in  a  period of oversupply, 
efforts by  industrialised countries  to diversify out 
of oil into other,  basically more  expensive  and  less 
flexible  sources,  ease  up.  Yet,  contrary  to  the 
developing  countries,  the  North,  particularly  the 
western  industrialised countries,  have  good  long-term - 66  -
reasons  for  reducing  their dependence  on  a  technically-
cheap  energy  source  like oil.  As  Table III shows,  the 
present proven oil reserves  are  heavily concentrated 
in  the  Third  World,  where  just over  70%  of  them  are 
located.  Western  industrialised countries hold  less 
than  10%  of oil  reserves,  yet  account  for  60%  of current 
consumption. 
Although  at present rates of  consumption,  the  proven 
oil reserves provide only  another  30  years  guaranteed 
supply,  there is  abou~ twice  as  much  again  (180-200 
billion tonnes)  already  .. i.dentified  as  additional 
recoverable  resources  and  new  discoveries  can  be  expected 
as  current  exploration  effort~ yeild their  results. 
TABLE  III 
OIL  WHERE  IT  ro1ES  FRCM •••  AND  WHERE  IT  GOES ••• 
Proven  reserves  %  Consumption  %  (bn  tonnes)  (mn  b/d) 
North  America  5.0  (  5. 5)  17  (28.6) 
Latin America  11.4  (12.7)  4  (  6.7) 
Middle  East  48.7  (54. 1)  2  (  3.4) 
\·'J.  Europe  3.3  (  3.7)  14  (  23. 5) 
Africa  7.5  (  8.3)  1.5  (  2. 6) 
E.  Europe  & Soviet Union  11.5  (12.8)  11.5  (19.3) 
Japan  - - 4.5  (  7. 5) 
Asia/Pacific  2.6  (  2. 9)  5  (  8.4) 
90  (  100%)  59.5  (  100%) 
Source  Oil & Gas  Journal,  International Energy  Agency  (lEA). - 67  -
The  huge  increases  in oil prices  imposed  by  the  OPEC 
countries  have,  as  has  been  seen,  caused  major 
difficulties for  many  oil  importers  in  the  Third 
World.  However,  despite their  apparently contradictory 
interests,  the  developing  countries  have  maintained 
more  solidarity  among  each  other  during  North-South 
negotiations  than  the  industrialised nations.  Third 
World  solidarity has  been  possible  for  two  reasons.  The 
first is that the  OPEC  countries  have  used  the oil weapon 
on  behalf of the  developing  countries  as  a  whole  in order 
to push  the  industrialised states  into  a  meaningful  global 
dialogue  on  the  whole  range  of  issues  the  Third  World 
wanted  to negotiate  in  the  framework  pf  their  New 
International  Economic  Order  (NIEO) •  The  second  reason 
is that  the  OPEC  countries  have  accepted  considerable 
responsibilities for  granting  financial  aid  to other 
developing  countries  as  a  result of  their  higher oil 
revenues.  If one  leaves  aside  the  poorer  OPEC  countries 
like  Indonesia,  Nigeria,  Venezuela  and  Iran,  the  Arab  oil 
exporters give eight  times  more  official development  aid 
than  the western  industrialised countries  as  measured 
as  a  proportion of Gross  National  Product  (GNP)  and 
massively  more  than  the  Soviet  Union  and  its East 
European partners. 
Raw  materials 
Even  before North-South  divergences cristallised around 
energy,  food  products  and  raw  materials  in general  were 
already  the  key  element  in  the  global  rich-poor  relation-
ship.  This  is true  even  if primary  products  (excluding 
energy)  represent  a  relatively small  share of 
industrialised countries' imports.  The  proportion of 
these  items  in  the  European  Community's  imports  is 
about  15%.  This  is also  true  although  raw  materials 
represent  the declining  rather  than  the  dynamic  sector 
of  Third.world development. - 68  -
Why  should  this  be  ?  For  one  thing,  because  they  form 
the olaest economic  link  between  South  and  North,  they 
carry  the  weight of historic  injustices.  Since  raw 
materials,  until very  recently were  the  only goods 
exported  by  developing  countries,  their  demands  for  a 
change  in  the world  economic  order  grew  up  around  raw 
materials-related  issues.  Finally,  raw  materials nearly 
always  involved  land  resources,  particularly in  the 
cases of minerals  and  metal  ores,  which  raised  questions 
of national  sovereignty.  The  exploitation of  their 
human  resources  by  using  them  as  cheap  labour  in plants 
set up  by  foreign  investors  has  always  been  a  less 
sensitive  issue with  Third  World  governments  than 
exploitihg  subsoil  resources constituted millions of 
years  ago. 
World  raw material  reserves  are  concentrated  in  the 
large continental  land  masses  of North  and  South  America, 
the  Soviet Union,  Australia and  Africa.  Of  these  regions, 
Africa's  riches  are  the  least charted  and  the  least 
developed.  With  certain exceptions,  the  territory of 
the  European  Community  is  poorly  endowed  with  mineral 
!esources.  It is  therefore heavily dependent  on  imported 
minerals  and  metals.  These  can  come  from  other  advanced 
countries or  from  the  Third  World.  Developing  countries 
reserves  are crucial  for  certain materials  in particular 
tin,  bauxite,  nickel,  cobalt,  etc.  The  same  is also 
true  for  certain tropical agricultural producbs  such 
as  cocoa,  coffee,  tea,  palm oil and  bananas. 
Table !Vindicates the  level of  import  dependence  of  the 
EEC  for  certain key  mineral  products,  compared  with  that 
of Japan  and  the  United  States.  While  Japan  is  even 
more  poorly  endowed  that  the  Community,  the  American 
level of external dependence  is considerably  lower  than 
the other  two.  Hence  its interest  in direct producer-
consumer  cooperation  is less marked. - 69  -
TABLE  IV 
LEVEL  OF  IMPORI'  DEPENDENCE  OF  'lliE  OC,  UNITED  STATFS  AND  JAPAN 
imports  as a  percentage of consumption 
oc  USA  JAPAN 
Aluminium  61  85  100 
Copper  81  - 90 
Lead  53  4  76 
Nickel  100  71  100 
Tin  87  75  97 
Zinc  68  64  80 
Iron ores  79  29  94 
Manganese  100  99  90 
Chromium  100  91  100 
Tungsten  99  54 
UranilDll  59 
Phosphates  99  - 100 
Asbestos  100  83  100 
Source  EEC  Commission  and  World  Bank. 
But  this  level of  import  dependence  has  a  mirror-image 
of export dependence  which  is much  more  crucial  for  many 
Third  World  countries,  whose  export  earnings  depend  on 
sales.of a  very  small  range  of  primary products. 
For  seven  among  them,  more  than  75%  of  their  export 
earnings  come  from  mineral  products  :  Chile,  Mauritania, 
Namibia,  Surinam,  Togo,  Zaire  and  Zambia. 
For  a  further  seven  the  export  dependence  is  50-75%  : 
Bolivia,  Jamaica,  Jordan,  Liberia,  Morocco,  Niger  and 
Papua-New  Guinea. 
It is  between  25%  and  50%  for  a  further  two  :  Guyana  and 
Peru. - 70  -
As  has  been  seen,  the  price of  non-fuel  raw  materials, 
the principal exports of  a  large  number  of developing 
countries outside  the  small  group of major oil exporters 
or  NIC's,  has  risen more  slowly  than  the  energy products 
and  manufactured  items  they  have  to  import.  Many  of 
these countries  are  members  of  the  low  income  group 
and  falling  revenues  from  raw  materials partly explain 
why  this group's  share of world  exports  has  falleri 
from  3.5%  in  1965  to  1.9%  in  1980.  With  more  than  60% 
of  their  food  and  agricultural materials  and  80%  of 
their mineral  exports  going  to western  industrialised 
countries,  the  commodity  trade of  the  developing  nations 
is acutely sensitive  to  economic  conditions  in  these 
countries.  Instability has  been  a  permanent  feature 
of  raw  material prices. 
As  we  have  seen,  this trade is largely controlled by  multinational 
corporations  based  in  the  industrialised countries 
who  have  traditionally shipped  commodities  in  raw  form 
from  the  developing  countries  for  processing  and 
marketing  in  the  consumer countries.  For  a  wide  range 
of commodities,  over  90%  of developing  countries• exports 
are  in  raw  form.  Vested  interests have  therefore 
prevented major  progress  towards  local  processing  from 
taking  place. 
Raw  materials,  have  thus  become  the  object of  bargaining 
at  two  levels.  One  concerns  the  producer  countries' 
demand  for  new  trade mechanisms  to  replace current 
arrangements  which,  ~lthough perceived  as  free  by  the 
industrialised consumers,  are  perceived  as  managed 
- to  their  disadvantage  - by  the  developing countries. 
Individual  commodity  agreements  have  had  only  limited 
success.  One  of  the  most  comprehensive,  that  for  sugar, 
has  been  unable  to contain  the  irresistable pressures of 
market  forces, when  they  force  prices  below  the  floor 
level set by  the  International  Agreement  (Table V ) . - 71  -
Redent  ~fforts have  centred  round  the  integrated 
programme  on  commodity  agreements set up  by  UNCI'AD  in  1976 
and  the  subsequent decision  to create  a  common  fund  to 
finance  commodity  agreements.  But  these  initiatives have 
made  only  limited  headway. 
TABLE  V 
25 
20 
INTERNATIONAL  SUGAR  PRICE 
US  cents/b. 
JASONDJFMAMJJASONOJFMAMJJASON 
1180  I  1981  I  1982 
Source  :  FAO,  Food  Outlook, 
(October  1982). - 72  -
The  difficulties  in organising  international  schemes 
for  stabilising  raw  material prices  have  encouraged 
efforts to devise other  stabilisation measures,  such 
as  compensation  for  export shortfalls rather  than 
trying  to  regulate  the  market  itself.  The  European 
Community,  through  its Stabex  scheme  for  agricultural 
commodities  and  its Sysmin  arrangement  for  minerals, 
has  made  a  considerable effort to stabilise export 
earnings of  the  developing  countries of  the African-
Pacific-Caribbean  (ACP)  group  associated with  it in 
the  Lome  convention.  Despite  this effort by  the 
Community,  and  the  more  wide-ranging  scheme  operated  by 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  through  its 
compensatory  financing  arrangements,  only  a  fraction of 
Third  World  export  shortfalls are  being  compensated. 
The  second  level of  bargaining  concerns essentially 
a  redistribution of  benefits  between  the  host country 
in  the  Third  World  and  the  foreign  investor  in  a 
mining  or  agricultural enterprise operating  on  its 
territory.  In  their desire  to  redress  previous 
imbalances,  host governments  have  resorted  to 
nationalisation  and  expropriation,  often without 
adequate  compensation.  The  result is  that much  new 
investment  in  raw  materials  and  mining  has  been 
transferred,  where  this  is possible,  to  industrialised 
raw  material producing  countries.  As  can  be  seen 
from  Table  VI,  the  European  Community  has  for  one 
reduced  its dependence  on  imports  of  primary  products 
from  the Third  World,  especially for  agricultural  raw 
materials  and  non-ferrous metals  in  favour  of other 
industrialised countries.  This  import  trend  reflects 
a  similar diversion of  investment  flows. - 73  -
TABLE  VI 
ORIGIN  OF  PRIMARY  PRODUCTS  IMPORTED  BY  THE  EEC  1973-1980 
(in  %) 
Food  Non-food  Mineral  Non-ferrous  agricultural  Fuels  products  raw  materials  products  metals 
1973  1980  1973  1980  1973  1980  1973  1980  1973 
IMPOR!'S  EXTRA-EX::  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
-INDUSTRIALISED  COUNT  41.8  42.0  45.8  52.6  43.8  46.8  4.5  9.7  38.5 
North America  25.8  26.7  14.3  20.7  25.0  32.5  2.5  2.1  19.2 
SOUTH  AFRICA,AUS-
TRALIA,N.ZEALAND  8.0  5.1  13.1  9.6  8.3  12.8  0.5  1.0  9.6 
-STATE  TRADING 
COUNI'RIES  7.5  4.8  11.2  11.0  6.3  4.4  6.6  10.9  9.6 
-DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  42.7  49.1  29.0  26.5  37.5  37.9  88.5  77.9  42.3 
Oil-exporting 
develop. countries  3.3  3.5  3.7  2.8  4.2  2.6  85.7  71.0  1.9 
Non-oil 
develop. countries  39.4  44.6  25.2  23.7  33.3  32.3  2.8  6.9  40.4 
Source  GATT- International trade  1980/81. 
But  beyond  the desire  for  internationally agreed 
investment  codes  for  host countries  and  codes  of 
conduct  for  multinational corporations,  the  essential 
interest-of both  producers  and  consumers  is  in stable 
and  remunerative prices.  Past efforts,  where  each 
side  has  tried  to make  the  most  of  the  advantages  it 
enjoyed  at  a  given  time,  have  failed  to grasp  the  need 
for  long-term mutually-acceptable  arrangements. 
Nationalisation of  resources  by  a  developing  country 
can  lead  to their  sterilisation.  The  lack  of  adequate 
Third  World  investments  by  industrialised countries 
will make  sure  that when  the next  commodity crisis 
occurs  its effect will  be  more  harmful  than  it would 
otherwise  be. 
1980 
100 
50.8 
22.7 
9.2 
6.8 
33.0 
4.1 
28.9 - 74  -
TRADE 
FOR  THE  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGISTS  OF  THE  1960's,  TRADE 
WAS  TO  BE  THE  VERY  STUFF  OF  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  PROGRESS 
IN  THE  THIRD  WORLD.  PREFERENTIAL  ACCESS  TO  THE  MARKETS 
OF  THE  INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES  WOULD  ENSURE  THE  EXPORT 
GROWTH  WHICH  PROVIDED  THE  REVENUES  FOR  IMPORTING  GOODS 
AND  SERVICES  VITAL  FOR  THEIR  OVERALL  DEVELOPMENT.  THE 
ABILITY  OF  INDIVIDUAL  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  TO  FINANCE  A 
GREAT  PART  OF  THEIR  ECONOMIC  ADVANCEMENT  THROUGH  EXPORT 
EARNINGS  ALSO  DETERMINED  THEIR  ABILITY  TO  SERVICE  THEIR 
DEBTS  AND  THEREFORE  TO  BORROW  MONEY  FROM  INTERNATIONAL 
BANKS.  BESIDES  EXPORTING  THEIR  PRIMARY  PRODUCTS,  THE 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  WOULD  GRADUALLY  BE  ABLE  TO  DEVELOP 
LABOUR-INTENSIVE  MANUFACTURED  PRODUCTS  FOR  WHICH  THEIR 
CONSIDERABLY  LOWER  ~ABOUR COSTS  GAVE  THEM  A COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE  OVER  THE  ADVANCED  COUNTRIES.  AS  TIME  WORE  ON, 
THEY  WOULD  MOVE  UP-MARKET  INTO  QUALITY  PRODUCTS  AND 
HIGHER  TECHNOLOGY  SECTORS. 
THIS  STRATEGY  HAS  WORKED  FOR  THE  NIC'S.  THEY  HAVE 
FOLLOWED  POLICIES  OF  EXPORT-LED  GROWTH,  CONCENTRATING 
FIRST  ON  TEXTILES,  CLOTHING  AND  FOOTWEAR,  AND  THEN 
MOVING  I~TO THE  PRODUCTION  OF  ELECTRONIC  COMPONENTS 
AND  BASIC  SECTORS  OF  HEAVY  INDUSTRY  SUCH  AS  STEEL  AND 
SHIPBUILDING.  THANKS  TO  SUCCESSIVE  OIL  PRICE  INCREASES, 
THE  PETROLEUM  EXPORTING  COUNTRIES  HAVE  ALSO  SUCCEEDED  IN 
ATTAINING  HIGH  LEVELS  OF  EXPORT-INDUCED  GROWTH. 
BY  CONTRAST,  MOST  LOW-INCOME  THIRD  WORLD  COUNTRIES  AND 
MANY  PRIMARY-PRODUCING  MIDDLE  INCOME  ONES  DID  ~OT HAVE 
THE  ECONOMIC  STRUCTURES  OR  HUMAN  SKILLS  TO  ALLOW  THEM 
TO  TAKE  PART  IN  THE  BOOMING  WORLD  MARKET  FOR  MANUFACTURES 
THAT  LASTED  THROUGHOUT  THE  1960's  AND  MOST  OF  THE  1970's. - 75  -
THEY  ALSO  SUFFERED  AN  ADDITIONAL  DISADVANTAGE  IN  THAT 
THE  PRICES  OF  MOST  OF  THEIR  RAW  MATERIALS  HAVE  EITHER 
DECLINED  OR  INCREASED  MORE  SLOWLY  THAN  THOSE  OF  OIL  OR 
MANUFACTURED  GOODS. 
BUT  EVEN  THE  NIC's  AND  THE  OPEC  couNTRIES  HAVE  BEEN  HIT 
BY  THE  WORLDWIDE  RECESSION  OF  THE  EARLY  1980's.  DEMAND 
FOR  THEIR  EXPORTS  IS  EASING,  AND  THIS  TREND  IS  BEING 
REINFORCED  BY  PROTECTIONIST  MEASURES  BEING  TAKEN  BY 
INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES.  THE  MULTI-FIBRE  ARRANGEMENT 
WHJCH  LIMITS  TRADE  IN  TEXTILES  AND  CLOTHING  IS  A STRIKING 
EXAMPLE.  T~ADE HAS  VIRTUALLY  STOPPED  GROWING.  SHOULD 
GROWTH  RATES  PICK  UP  AGAIN  IN  THE  FUTURE  IT  WILL  PROBABLY 
BE  AT  A SLOWER  RHYTHM  THAN  PREVIOUSLY.  IN  SUCH 
CIRCUMSTANCES,  THERE  IS  LITTLE  CHANCE  THAT  THE  ADVANCED 
NATIONS  WILL  PERMIT  A RETURN  TO  THE  FREE  MARKET  CONDITIONS 
THAT  CHARACTERISED  THE  PREVIOUS  20  YEARS.  IT  IS  THEREFORE 
UNLIKELY  THAT  THE  MODEL  OF  GROWTH  BASED  ON  THE  PRODUCTION 
OF  EXPORTABLE  GOODS  THAT  HAS  PROVED  VALID  FOR  THE  PRESENT 
NIC'S  WILL  BE  AVAILABLE  TO  THE  NEXT  GENERATION  OF  COUNTRIES 
STRIVING  TO  ATTAIN  THE  POINT  OF  ECONOMIC  TAKE-OFF. 
TRADE  WILL  REMAIN  IMPORTANT,  BUT  ITS  DIMINSHED  ROLE  IN 
DEVELOPMENT  TERMS  WILL  HAVE  TO  BE  COMPLEMEN1ED  IN  OTHER 
WAYS.  THE  ALTERNATIVES  HOWEVER  APPEAR  LIMITED. - 76  -
Trade  is vital for  development 
Trade  plays  a  double  role  in  the  development  process. 
At  the  basic  level,  exports of  primary  products  by 
developing  countries  have  generated  revenues  that  have 
enabled  them  to  import  some  of  the capital ~nd consumer 
goods  required  for  their  economic  and  social  advancement. 
At  a  second  stage  in  the  development  process,  the vast 
markets  of  the  industrialised countries  provide  the 
outlets  for  the first  and  second  generation of  manufactured 
goods  produced  by  Third  World  nations. 
This  textbook  approach  to  trade  and  industrialisation has 
been  at the  centre of  two  decades  of  Third  World 
development.  Until.the mid-1970's,  while  world  trade 
as  a  whole  was  still expanding  rapidly,  there  was  room 
for  everybody.  The  advanced  countries positively encouraged 
the  industrialisation of  the  Third  World  through 
investments,  credits  and  assured  access  to  their  markets 
for  their  export-oriented  industries.  In  fact,  world 
trade  as  a  whole  was  expanding  in  this period  much  faster 
than  that of  the developing  countries. 
Exports  of  manufactures  were  the  fastest growing  sector. 
Worldwide,  a  doubling  in  the  growth  rate of  trade  in 
manufactured  goods  more  than  made  up  for  slower  expansion 
of  trade  in  food  and  other  (non-fuel)  raw  materials. 
Among  the  developing  countries,  the principal 
beneficiaries of  this  trend  were  the  NIC's  who,  by 
active export  promotion  policies  and  diversifying  into 
a  wider  range  of  industrial products,  were  able  to 
expand  their markets  well  into the  post-1973  recession 
period.  Globally,  the  Third  World  raised  its share of  the 
manufactured  goods  imported  by  the  industrialised countries 
from  7%  in  1970  to  13%  ten years  later. - 77  -
But  closer  analysis of  these  figures  reveal  how  much 
of this growth  was  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a 
very  small  number  of  NIC's.  According  to  UNCTAD 
figures,  the  eight or  so  fast  growing  NIC's  in  its 
classification accounted  for  62%  of all manufactured 
goods  exported  by  the  Third  World  by  1977.  More 
recent  figures,  show  that  for  example  only  three 
developing  countries  - Hong  Kong,  South  Korea  and 
Taiwan  - accounted  for  not  less  than  42.6%  of all 
manufactured  items  from  the  Third  World  imported  by 
the  European  Community  in  1980.  These  three countries 
were  the  only group,  with  which  the  Community  has  a 
deficit  in manufactured  goods  (Table  I).  The  table 
also  shows  the concentration of  imports  from  other 
NIC's  and  middle  income  countries  such  as  Brazil, 
Mexico  and  the  members  of  ASEAN.  The  poorer  developing 
nations  such  as  the  ACP  group,  despite  their preferential 
trade  links with  the  Community,  supplied less  than 
o%  of  EEC  imports  of  Third  World  manufactures. 
For  countries that  have  remained  largely dependent  on 
exports of primary commodities,  the  trade  environment 
has  been  less favorable.  For  one  thing,  prices of 
non-oil  primary products  rose  less fast  than  for  fuels and 
manufactured  items.  For  another,  price movements  from 
year  to year  were  erratic,  preventing  the  implementation 
of coherent development  policies.  Many  countries  were 
reduced  to  a  short-term hand-to-mouth  approach  to 
economic  planning.  A third  factor  was  the protectionist 
attitude of  industrialised countries concerning  imports 
of certain agricultural  raw  materials  from  the  Third 
World.  World  trade  in manufactures  was  fostered  by  the 
successive  rounds  of tariff-cutting negotiations  with 
the  framework  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (GATT)  as  well  as  by  the  Generalised  Systems  of 
Preferences  (GSP's)  in  favour  of manufactured  and  semi-
processed  goods  from  the  Third  World  applied  by  the 
main  industrialised countries. TABLE  1 
GEXX;AAPHIC  BRFJ\K-IDVN  OF  EEX:  TRADE  IN  MANUFACIURED  PIDDUCI'S  ~'VITH DE.VELOPING  COUNTRIES 
1980 
IMPORTS  EXPORTS 
ocu•s  %of Extra- % of  ocu•s  %of Extra- % of 
millions  EEX:  total  '!bird World  millions  EOC  total  '!bird World 
'HURD  \'DRLD  'IUI'AL  16,378  16.5  100.- 65,144  38.3  100.-
•  ACP  (59  countries)  942  0.9  5.8  11,539  6.8  17.7 
•  South Mediterranean 
(without Libya)  1,  781  1.8  10.9  11,777  6.9  18.1 
•  GULF  + Libya  624  0.6  3.8  18,748  11.0  28.8 
•  Other Cbuntries of Asia  10,481  10.5  64.0  10,716  6.3  16.4 
of which  :  Indian Sub-
Cbntinent  1,531  1. 5  9.4  2,925  1.7  4.5 
of which  :  ASEAN  1,970  2.0  12.0  4,451  2.6  6.8 
of which  :  Hong-Kong, 
South Korea 
& Taiwan  6,980  7.0  42.6  3,340  2.0  5.1 
•  LATIN  AMERICA  1,862  1.9  11.4  11,381  6.7  17.5 
of which  :  Brazil 
& Mexico  1,091  1.1  6.7  4,112  2.4  6.3 
----- --
Source  :  Eurostat & Monthly FOreign Trade Bulletins. 
BALAN-cE 
ocu•s 
millions 
+ 48,766 
+ 10,597 
+  9,996 
+  18,124 
+  235 
+  1,394 
+  2,481 
- 3,640 
+  9,519 
+  3,021 
' 
! 
I 
I 
I 
-.J 
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Agriculture  was  largely excluded  from  these efforts, 
particularly as  far  as  goods  from  the  Third  World  which 
competed  with  temperate  products  from  the  industrialised 
North  were  concerned.  This  partly explains  why  trade  in 
agricultural products  has consistently grown  more  slowly 
than  trade  in manufactures,  even  in  the  period  preceding 
the onset of  the current recession  (Table  II). 
TABLE  II 
GRCWI'H  OF  ViORLD  EXPORI'S,  1963-1981 
(Average  annual  rate of change  in volume,  percentages) 
1963-73  1973-81  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981 
Total  8~  3~  3~  -3  11  4~  5~  5~  1~  0 
Agricultural products  4  4~  -3~  5  9~  2  9  7  3  3 
Minerals*  7  -2~  -2~  -7~  4~  2  1~  5  -8  -12 
Manufactures  11  5  8~  -4~  13  5  5  5  4~ 
*  Including  fuels and  non-ferrous metals. 
Source  :  Gatt - International Trade  1981/82. 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  table,  the  overall level of  world 
trade ·has  increased  more  slowly  since  1973  with  an  average 
growth  rate of  3.5%  for  the  period  1973-1981  as  against 
8.5%  between  1963  and  1973.  Only  once  since  1973  has 
the  volume  of world  trade  expanded  at  a  level  higher than 
the  average  for  the  previous decade. 
The  end  of  a  period of  steady  expansion 
The  recession provoked  by  the  two  oil shocks  of  the  1970's 
has  affected world  trade  in  a  number  of  ways.  First of 
4~ 
all it has  brought  to  an  end  the  period  where  the 
relatively open  trading  system was  able  to accelerate  the 
integration of developing countries  into  the  world  economy. - 80  -
The  industrialised countries  and  their markets  were 
ascribed  the  role of  a  "locomotive"  that would  pull 
the developing  countries  behind  it towards  higher 
ievels of  economic  and  industrial development.  But 
demand  (and  imports)  in the  industrialised countries 
have  been  most  affected  by  the  recession.  As  Table  III 
indicates,  the  industrialised countries'  imports 
actually fell  in  volume  in  1980  and  1981.  The  performance 
of  the  advanced  nations  is determining  for  the  Third 
World  as  the  former  still account  for  nearly  two-thirds 
of world  imports. 
TABLE  III 
WORLD  TRADE  SUMMARY I  1963-82 
(Percentage changes  in volume) 
Change  from  Preceding  Year 
Average 
1963-72  1973  1975  1977  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Exports 
Industrial countries  9.0  13.2  -4.6  5.1  6.7  4.6  2.6  2.0 
Developing  countries 
Oil exp:>rting countries  9.1  14.8 -11.5  0.6  3.0 -12.8 -16.3  -9.0 
Non-oil developing 
countries  6.7  8.9  -o.5  4.7  9.4  5.6  3.9  f1.5 
Imports 
Industrial countries  9.0  12. 1  -8.1  4.2  8.4  -1.3  -2.3  2.0 
Developing  countries 
Oil exporting countries  8.3  20.3  41.4  15.2  -12.3  14.9  19.8  5.0 
Non-oil developing 
countries  6.2  11.6  -4.4  6.7  11.0  3.9  2.2  3.0 
Note  :  1982  figures are estimates 
Source  :  IMP,  w:>rld  Fconanic  Outlook,  1982. - 81  -
Depressed  demand  in  the  industrialised countries 
has  reduced  the  amount  of  goods  they  buy  from  the 
developing  countries.  But  their  imports  have  also 
been cut  back  in  another  way  :  through  protectionism. 
Protectionism 
World  trade  attained  its most  open  phase  in  the  late 
1960's  and  early  1970's after  the  Kennedy  Round  of 
Tariff cutting negotiations  had  brought  about 
reductions of one-third  in  the  level of duties  applied 
fY  advanced  nations  to  their  imports of  manufactured 
1goods.  This  movement  did  not,  as  we  have  seen, 
extend  to trade  in  agriculture products  which  is 
much  less liberalised.  The  openness  of  industrial 
countries's markets  during  this  period  was  reinforced 
by  the  introduction of  the Generalised  System of 
Preferences  (GSP)  which  they  accorded  to  imports  from 
the  Third  Wor'ld.  The  GSP  gave  duty-free  access  to 
manufactured  and  semi-processed  goods  from  developing 
nations  and  was  also  in  some  cases  extended  to certain 
agricultural products  as  well.  The  European  Community 
was  the first major  trading  power  to  introduce  a  GSP 
(in  1971).  The  GSP  is  a  unilateral  system  applied  by 
the  importing  country  which  can  change  the  rules 
without  consulting  its Third  World  suppliers. 
As  the  recession  has  worsened  and  as  competition  from 
the  Third World,  particularly the NIC's,has  sharpened, 
the  industrialised countries  have  made  their  GSP's  more 
restrictive for  those  developing  countries  that have 
drawn  most  benefits  from  the  system.  This  trend  has 
been paralleled  by  a  similar  development  in  the Multi-
Fibre Arrangement  (MFA)  which  has  controlled world 
trade  in textiles  and  clothing  since  1973.  The  rate 
at which  Third  World  suppliers are  permitted  to  expand 
exports to  the  industrialised countries  has  been  cut 
back  with  each  successive  renegotiation of  the  MFA. - 82  -
Fbr  instance, .the EEC's  so-ca~~ea aam1nant  suppliers have  even 
had  to accept  actual  reductions  in  their  shipments  of 
certain sensitive  items  in  the  1982-86  MFA. 
But  the  MFA  is only  the  tip of  the  protectionist 
iceberg.  Devices  to  limit  imports of manufactured 
goods  have  sprung  up,  often  in  the  twilight  zone 
outside  the  control of  GATT,  in  a  number  of sectors. 
These  measures  take  the  form  of  voluntary restraint 
agreements,  orderly marketing  arrangements,  the 
obligatory respect of minimum  import  prices,  the 
application of countervailing or  anti-dumping  duties. 
They  have  been  imposed  by  industrialised countries 
on  imports  from  the  developing  nations of  a  wide  range 
of products,  including  footwear,  cutlery,  bicycles, 
tv sets,  electrical  and  electronic components,  steel. (1) 
It is difficult to calculate the  extent of  the  negative 
effect on  Third  World  exports of  these protectionist 
measures.  For  if one  can  monitor  the  flow  of goods 
subject to restrictive barriers,  it is virtually 
impossible  to assess  what  their  volume  would  have  been 
had  the  limitations not  been  put  into place.  Given  the 
persistence of  the  recession  and  the  relentless rise 
in  unemployment  levels  in  the  advanced  nations,  it is 
unlikely that protectionist pressures will abate 
during  the  foreseeable  future. 
But  the  recession  has  also affected  the  Third  World's 
ability to  import  products  from  the  industrialised 
countries.  Many  non-oil developing  nations  have  had 
to cut  back  on  other  imports  in order  to set aside 
enough  hard  currency  to  pay  for  their  steeply mounting 
oil bills.  Even  the oil exporting  countries  themselves 
are  importing  less.  The  recession  has  cut demand  for 
oil even  further  following  on efforts by  consumer 
countries  to  save  energy  and  develop  alternative sources. 
(1)  According  to  UNCTAD's  Trade  and  Development  Report  1981, 
industrialised countries restrict  imports  on  at least 
280 manufactured  items  from  the  NIC's. - 83  -
In  such circumstances,  prices eased  in real  terms 
between  1980  and  1982.  With  lower  oil revenues, 
petroleum exporting  countries  sharply  reduced  their 
import  growth  rate.  From  nearly  15%  in  1980  and  20% 
in  1981  (see  Table  III),  it had  fallen  to  an  estimated 
5%  in  1982. 
The  acute  level of  indebtedness of  some  developing 
countries  had  by  1982  led  to  a  refusal  by  the 
international banking  system to  lend  them  more  money. 
A number  of debtor  countries experienced difficulties 
in earning  enough  from  their  exports  in order  to 
service  their debts.  Massive  rescheduling  operations 
to postpone debt  repayments  were  improvised.  As  a 
first step  towards  trying  to restore  a  sounder  financial 
situation,  many  debtor  countries  have  tried to eliminate 
all but  the most  essential  imports. 
The  degree of  indebtedness of  some  newly  industrialising 
countries has  delayed  or  at least muted  calls  by  the 
industrialised countries  for  the  NIC's  to open  their 
markets  and  accept  the  full  impact of  GATT  free-trade 
rules. - 84  -
South-South  trade 
The  exports  from  the developing  countries  are  largely, 
but not  totally,dependent  on  access  to  the markets  of 
the  industrialised countries.  Trade  among  the  developing 
countries  the~selves,  "South-South"  trade,  is  growing. 
According  to estimates  from  the  World  Bank,  (see  Table  IV) 
trade  between developing  countries will rise  from  7%  of 
world  trade  in  1980  to  9%  in  1990.  The  share  of Third 
World  exports going  to other  developing  countries  is 
forecast  to rise  from  27%  to  32%  during  the  same  period. 
Most  of this growth  is likely to  be  the  supply of primary 
products  to oil exporting  countries  and  NIC's.  South-
South  trade  in  raw  materials  is expected  to rise  from 
8%  to  11%  of world  trade  in  these  commodities  during  the 
1980's while  intra-Third World  trade  in manufactures will 
remain  unchanged  at  5%  of  the world  total.  These 
figures  would  be  higher,  of course,  if developing 
countries could  agree  to liberalise their  trade with 
each  other. 
TABLE  IV 
TRADE  FLOWS 
as a ·percentage of world  trade 
Year  Origi~ 
Destination  'lbtal  North  South 
North  so  24  74 
1980  South  19  7  26 
--------- ~------------------------------- ---------
North  51  21  72 
1990  South  19  9  28 
Source  W:>rld  Bank,  W:>rld  Development  Report  1981. - 85  -
While  the  World  Bank  figures  give  some  cause  for  optimism, 
South-South  trade  is no  substitute  for  South-North  export 
flows.  Although  increased  trade  among  the  members  of 
the  Third  World  boosts  their  collective self-reliance 
it is unlikely that its growth  will alter  the  under-
privileged status of  the  least  advanced  countries or 
middle  income  nations still dependent  on  raw  material 
exports.  As  Table  V  indicates,  their  share of  world 
trade fell  from  5.6%  to  under  2%  in  the  25  years  to  1980. 
TABLE V 
SHARES  OF  WJRLD  MERCHANDISE  EXPORI'S,  1955-1980 
(percent) 
Country group  1955  1965  1970  1980 
All developing countries  27.3  20.2  18.4  21.4 
Low-income  ( 5. 6)  ( 3. 4)  ( 2. 5)  ( 1.9) 
Middle-income  (21.7)  (16.8)  (19.5)  (19.5) 
High-income oil exporters  2. 1  2.5  2.4  10.2 
Centrally-planned economies  8.5  10.9  10.1  7.9 
Industrial market  economies  - 62.1  66.5  69.0  60.5 
world  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1982. - 86  -
This  contrasts  ~harply with  the  performance  of  the 
major  exporters of manufactures  (the  NIC's)  who  alone 
among  the  world's  nations  except  for  oil exporters 
and  Japan  were  able  to  raise  their  share of  world 
expo~ts in significant  fashion  between  1970  and  1980 
(from  6.2%  to 8%).  'Ibe  least develo(?ed  countries risk being left further 
behind  in  future.  In  addition  to  the  slow-down  of 
world  trade growth  patterns,  most  forecasters  expect 
prices of  their principal  raw  materialp  exports  to 
decline  further  during  the  1980's. 
Notions  about  what  can  be  done  in  the  hard  times  ahead 
for  these countries  centre  on  fostering  self-help 
measures  such  as  assisting  them  to  process  some  of 
their  raw materials  locally,  aiding  them  acquire  better 
commercial  and  marketing  structures  in order  to profit 
more  from  their  own  domestic  and  neighbouring  markets. 
To  implement  such  policies  the  poorest countries will 
continue  to need  large  amounts  of  financial  support  from 
outside.  It is not clear  where  this will  come  from1 
official development  assistance  (ODA)  from  the  industri-
alised countries  is not  expected  to  increase signficantly 
in  terms of share of Gross  National  Product  (GNP)  over 
the  next  few  years.  If this  is  the case,donors must 
concentrate on  priority countries  even  where  they  feel 
that their  own  commercial  interests might  be  better 
served  by  granting  their  aid  to other  candidates.  Given 
that  the  advanced  nations  are  no  longer  ready  to  allow 
Third  World  countries  to  trade  their  way  forward  in  the 
same  way  as  before,  they will have  to  bear  a  considerable 
part of  the  responsibility  for  devising  alternative ways 
of helping  them  move  ahead. - 87  -
1NDUSTRIALISATION  AND  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER 
INDUSTRIALISATION  OF  THE  THIRD  WORLD  AND  THE  NORTH-SOUTH 
TRANSFER  OF  TECHNOLOGY  WERE  CONSIDERED  TO  BE  A VITAL 
SHORT-CUT  TO  ENABLE  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  TO  CATCH  UP 
WITH  SOME  THE  MATERIAL  AND  SOCIAL  WELL-BEING  ENJOYED  BY 
THE  POPULATIONS  OF  THE  INDUSTRIALISED  NATIONS.  AS  WITH 
OTHER  ASPECTS  OF  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGY  IT  HAS  WORKED 
IMPERFECTLY.  FOR  ONE  THING,  IT  HAS  BENEFITTED  MAINLY 
THE  MORE  ADVANCED  OF  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  OR  THOSE 
WHERE  HUMAN  SKILLS  AND  CAPITAL  (OR  ACCESS  TO  CAPITAL) 
COULD  BE  ADDED  TO  TRADITIONAL  RAW  MATERIAL  RESOURCES. 
FOR  ANOTHER  IT  HAS  NOT  CREATED  MORE  EGALITARIAN  SOCIETIES 
POR  IN  MOST  INSTANCES  THE  ADVANTAGES  OF  INDUSTRIALISATION 
HAVE  BEEN  RESERVED  LARGELY  FOR  THE  RULING  ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND  BUSINESS  CLASS  AND  TO  A LESSER  EXTENT  THE  URBAN 
WORKFORCE.  RURAL  ZONES  HAVE  BEEN  NEGLECTED  AND  DIFFERENCES 
WITHIN  AS  WELL  AS  BETWEEN  COUNTRIES  ACCENTUATED. 
INDUSTRIALISATION  AND  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  HAVE  ENABLED 
SOME  THIRD  WORLD  COUNTRIES  TO  MAKE  UP  PART  OF  THE  GAP 
WITH  THE  ADVANCED  NATIONS  AND  TO  PARTICIPATE  IN  THE 
WORLD  TRADING  SYSTEM.  IT  HAS  ALSO  IN  RECENT  YEARS  AIDED 
THE  ECONOMIES  OF  THE  INDUSTRIALISED  NATIONS  BY  PROVIDING 
THEM  WITH  MARKETS  FOR  CAPITAL  GOODS  TO  OFFSET  THE 
EFFECTS  OF  LOWER  DOMESTIC  DEMAND.  BUT  INCREASINGLY  THE 
DYNAMIC  NIC'S  ARE  FACING  PROTECTIONIST  BARRIERS  FOR  THEIR 
MANUFACTURED  EXPORTS  ON  THE  MARKETS  OF  THE  INDUSTRIALISED 
COUNTRIES.  INDUSTRIALISATION  IS  LIKELY  THEREFORE  TO  BE 
A SLOWER  AND  MORE  DIFFICULT  PROCESS  FOR  SECOND-
GENERATION  NIC'S  THAN  FOR  THEIR  HANDFULL  OF  PREDECESSORS. 
THE  POOREST  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  ARE  THE  ONES  THAT 
HAVE  BENEFITTED  LEAST  FROM  INDUSTRIALISATION.  IN  1981, 
HONG  KONG  ALONE  EXPORTED  TWICE  AS  MUCH  CAPITAL  GOODS 
TO  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AS  ALL  THE  63  COUNTRIES  OF 
THE  LOME  CONVENTION  PUT  TOGETHER. - 88  -
Industrialisation works  for  some ••• 
The  industrial  and  technological  superiority of  the 
North  is  one  of  the  most  visible  aspects  of  the 
North-South  gap.  The  industrialisation of  the  Third 
World  and  the  transfer  of  manufacturing  technology 
from  North  to South  were  perceived  by  the  developing 
countries  as  the essential means  of  narrowing  the  gap 
and  of  breaking  the  domination of  the  world  production 
and  trading  structures  by  the  advanced  nations. 
Industrialisation has  come  to  be  synonymous  with 
development.  It was  assumed  that it would  gradually 
bestow  on  the developing  countries  the  same  benefits, 
not  only  in  terms  of growth  and  prosperity but  also 
in  terms  of  job creation,  as  it had  over  the  years 
on  the  industrialised world. 
This  model  of  industrialisation  based  on  the  Western 
pattern has  worked  for  a  limited  group of  developing 
countries who  geared  their output  almost  exclusively 
to  the markets  of  the  advanced  countries  and  whose 
level of  human  skills  and  access  to  sources  of 
financing  were  better  than  that of  the majority of 
developing  countries. 
Besides  increasing  their export capacities,  the 
NIC's,  together  with  several larger  semi-industrialised 
developing  countries  such  as  India,  Mexico  and 
Argentina,  have  absorbed  and  adapted  western 
technologies,  and  have  themselves  established 
capacities  for  industrial training  and  research.  But 
it is far  from  likely that the factors that have  helped  them  achieve - 89  -
their present positions  such  as  market  size,  resource 
endowment,  human  skills  (in  terms  of education, 
entrepreneurship  and  marketing)  will  be  repeated  in  the 
case of  the majoritY of  Third  World  countries.  Even 
within  this small  group  progress  has  been  uneven.  Internal 
income  disparities  remain  large,  industrial  zones  are 
poorly  integrated  into national structures,  social 
progress  is often limited.  India,  for  instance,  has 
provinces  as  industrialised as  any  of  the  NIC's,  but 
also  regions  of  extreme  poverty. 
A group of  30  or  so  developing  countries  mainly  in 
Asia,  Latin  America  and  the Mediterranean  area  are 
trying  to  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  the  NIC's.  But 
their chances of  rapid  success  in  the  present  world 
recession are limited  :  their  main  export markets  are 
not  expanding  fast  enough;  their capacity  to  borrow  and 
to  expand  and  improve  their  productive capacities  is 
restricted  by  the  huge  problems  posed  by  overall 
Third  World  indebtedness.  Their  principal exports 
are of  the  labour  intensive manufactures  such  as 
textiles,  clothing;  and  leather  goods,  which  were  at 
the  root of  the  industrialisation process of  the  NIC's. 
World  markets  for  these  products  are particularly 
clogged.  The  very  success of  the original NIC's  them-
selves  is going  to  make  it difficult for  the  second-
generation NIC • s  to .emulate  them.  Alternative strategies and 
alternative outlets,  especially  in  the  South-South 
framework,will  have  to  be  developed  alongside  more 
traditional but  slow-growing  South-North  manufactured 
trade  flows. 
The  industrialisation  and  technology  transfer  process 
is  bound  to  be  affected  by  the  worldwide 
recession  and  the  increasing  problem of Third  World 
debt.  Developing  countries  are  going  to  find  it 
increasingly  hard  to secure  financing  for  the 
acquisition of capital goods  and  technology. - 90  -
•••  but  less well  for  others 
Despite  its clear benefits  for  the  NIC's  it must  be 
recognised  that  industrialisation on  the Western  model 
has  worked  much  less well  for  the  majority of 
developing  count~ies.  The  shortcomings of  the  system 
can  too easily outweigh  the  narrow  economic  advantages. 
Plants  producing  the  same  type  of products  using  the 
same  techniques  as  the  North  are  not  always  competitive. 
This  strategy also discriminates  against  the  rural 
sector  and  against  small-scale traditional industries. 
It accelerates  the  influx of  people  from  the countryside 
to  the cities, creating  an  urban  sub-proletariat. 
While  the  gross  national product  per  capita has 
risen  in  the developing countries  thanks  to  indus-
trialisation,  the other  adjustments  which  were 
expected  to  follow did  not  occur.  The  implantation 
of western  production  techniques  did  not create 
enough  jobs  relative to population growth,nor did it 
eradicate poverty.  In  fact,  there  is considerable 
evidence,  particularly in  the  low-income  countries, 
that  income  distribution became  even  worse.  The 
fruits of what  growth  that occured  through  industri-
alisation were  largely  reserved  for  urban  areas  and 
more  especially for  the  small  ruling  administrative 
and  business class. 
Most  industrial production  in  the  modern  sectors 
created  in  the developing  countries  has  been  aimed 
first  and  foremost  at meeting  existing patterns of 
demand  for  final  consumer  goods,  whether  for  domestic 
or  world  markets.  Since  the  poor  have little 
purchasing  power,  their  needs  have  not  been  reflected 
to  any  marked  degree  in  the  demand  structure of  the 
manufacturing  sector.  This  is much  more  determined - 91  -
by  the  preferences of  higher  income  groups  whose 
demand  for  industrial  consumer  goods  takes  its lead 
from  the  tastes  and  values of  their  peers  in  the 
industrialised countries. 
The  purpose of  Industrialisation 
The  record of Third  World  industrialisation to date 
raises  the question  as  to  the  aims  of  industrialisation 
and  the  transfer of  technology.  Broadly  speaking  it 
can  serve overall developmental  goals  in  any  or  all of 
three  ways  : 
by  meeting  domestic  and/or  regional  needs  for 
manufactured  products, 
by  processing  raw  materials  locally rather  than 
ship  them  untreated  to  the  processing  industries 
of  the  North, 
by  producing  manufactured  goods  for  export  to 
world  markets  by  exploiting  the  local  advantage 
of cheap  labour. 
Emphasis  so  far  has  been  principally on  the  third of 
these  alternatives  since  access  to  the  markets  of  the 
advanced  nations  was  seen  as  an  essential element  in 
the  industrialisation process.  There  are  two  reasons 
for  this.  Firstly,  precisely  because  the developing 
countries  are  poor,  they  lack  initially the  home  market 
to  absorb  the  large  amounts  of  goods  produced  with 
modern  methods~  exports  must  make  up  the difference. 
Secondly,  these countries  need  the  capital goods  sold 
by  the  North  to equip  their  industries  and  acquire  the 
technology  needed  for  their  industrialisation.  To 
pay  for  these,  again,  exports  are essential. 
But  this  kind  of off-shore manufacturing  for  the 
markets  of  the  industrialised countries  has  created 
modern  enclaves  inside  their  territory that have 
served  to polarise  rather  than  integrate national 
societies  and  to  increase social conflict. - 92  -
The  transfer of  technology  involved  - making  products 
for  the .North  using  machines  imported  from  the  North  -
is  fairly  limited.  For  these,  and  other,  reasons  more 
stress  is  now  being  put  on  the  first  two  purposes  as 
well. 
Producing  manufactures  for  the  domestic  market  has  long 
been  an  aim  of  the  developing  countries.  Previously, 
this has  taken  the  form  of  import  substitution. 
The  idea  was  to create  local capacities  to  make  items 
for  which  technology or  know-how  were  available or 
could  be  acquired  relatively easily  instead of  using 
scarce  hard  currency  to  import  them  from  the 
industrialised countries.  In  many  instances,  these 
infant  industries  turned  out  to  be  inefficient  and 
uncompetitive,  able  to  survive  only  behind  high  walls 
of tariff  and  fiscal  protection.  Their  justification 
was  that  they  saved  hard  currency  and  created  some 
local  jobs. 
Now  the  idea  is gaining  ground  that  local  production 
should  be  directly  linked  to  the effective  transfer 
of  technology,  from  the  advanced  countries.  Hence 
the  insistance  by  a  number  of developing  nations  on  at 
least local  assembly  of certain products,or  in  some 
cases  requirements  to  use  a  set percentage of  local 
components  or  materials  in  the  item being  manufactured. 
By setting  specific local content  requirements, 
governments  feel  international corporations will  be 
forced  to subcontract  to  local  firms  thereby  broadening 
their  technological  scope  and  experience.  In  addition, 
by  thinking  in  terms  not only of national  but  of 
regional markets,  economies  of scale  and  large-scale 
production  units could  be  viable without  dependence  on 
Northern markets  for  survival. 
The  other  option  - the  local processing of  raw 
materials  - is  a  logical  sequel  to present  North-South 
economic  relations.  It transfers  to  the  producer  country - 93  -
the  considerable extra value  added  to  its raw  material 
in  the  transformation process.  It can  then  sell its own 
dearer  processed  items  on  international markets  (North  or 
South)  without  handing  over  the  most  profitable operations 
to  firms  in  the  industrialised countries while  at  the 
same  time  adding  to its own  national  technological  base. 
Here  too of course capital goods  imported  from  the  North 
are  required  to start the  process. 
Petrochemicals  is  an  obvious  example,  particularly as 
the  developing  countries  that wish  to create  a  petro-
chemical  capacity are  those  with  the  raw  materials  -
oil and  natural  gas  - which  assure  them  adequate 
revenues  to  buy  in  turn-key plants  and  equipment 
from  the  industrialised countries.  The  OPEC  countries 
plus  countries like  India  and  South  Korea  in Asia,  and 
Brazil  and  Mexico  in  Latin  America  plan  a  major  expansion 
of  their output of  basic petrochemicals.  Although  the 
recession may  force  a  downward  adjustment  in  these 
forecasts,  recent projections  expect  the  developing 
countries'  share  in  world  production of  these  items  to 
rise  from  9%  in  1979  to  15%  by  the  mid-1980's  and 
possibly  20-25%  by  1990. 
The  processing of  iron-ore  into steel is  another  area 
where  Third  World  output  has  risen  sharply  in  recent 
years  and  according  to  OECD  estimates  (see  Table  I) 
is  going  to  go  on  rising  at nearly  the  same  level over 
the  next  few  years,  despite  the  less  favourable  world-
wide  economic  environment.  The  biggest growth  will  be 
in  Latin  America  followed  by  South  East  Asia;  the 
highest  level of relative expansion will  be  Africa  -
but only  because  its starting point  is so  low.  Already 
a  number  of  industrialised countries,  including  the 
members  of  the  European  Community,  limit their  imports 
of steel products  from  NIC's  like  South  Korea  and  Brazil. - 94  -
TABLE  I 
ESTIMATED  EXPANSICN  IN  CRUDE  STEEL-MAKING  CAPACITY 
IN NON-QOCD  CCXJNTRIES 
(million tonnes) 
1978  1985  Increase  Annual rate of growth in prod. 
Nominal  Nominal  1985/  1980/1974  1985/1978  capacity  capacity  1978  %  % 
Total Non-ooco  Countries  65.8  107.5  + 41.7  +  10.2  +  9. 1 
Latin America  31.7  51.4  +  19.7  +  8.4  +  7.7 
Africa  (excluding  South 
Africa)  2.0  4.5  +  2.5  +  7.7  +  17.9 
Middle  East  3.6  6.7  +  3. 1  +  13.9  +  12.3 
S.E.  Asia  28.5  44.9  +  16.4  +  13.7  +  8.8 
OOCD  Countries  566.0  - 2.3 
Source  OOCD  Steel CoiTIDittee  t'brking  Paper  (June  1982). 
The  means  of  transferring  technolo~y 
The  transfer of  technology  has  been  a  decisive  factor 
for  growth  throughout  the world's  history.  In earlier 
times,  technology  spread  from  China  and  the  Arab  world 
to  Europe  and  then  from  Europe  to  America.  In  more 
recent  times,  technical  innovation  was  centred  in  the 
United  States and  has  spread  outwards,  in  two  directions 
back  across  the Atlantic  to Europe  and  across  the  Pacific 
to Japan.  Historically,  technology  was  transferred  by 
skilled persons  moving  from  advanced  to less  advanced 
countries or  acquired  by  people  from  the  latter who 
were  schooled  during  long  visits to  the  former. 
Nowadays,  technology  is transferred  in  many  different 
ways.  For  the  developing countries it originates 
largely  in  the  industrialised countries of  the  North. - 95  -
The .latter account  for more  than  95%  of world  spending 
on  researcp  and  development.  The  channels  of technology 
transmission  include  : 
capital goods  imported  by  developing  countries  to 
equip their own  manufacturing  industries.  Textile 
machinery  from  the  North  for  the  textile  and 
clothing  industries of  the  South  is  an  obvious 
example, 
direct  investments  by multinational corporations 
in manufacturing  facilities  in  developing  countries, 
particularly those  with  strong  domestic  or  regional 
growth  market potential or  which  can  serve  as  "off-
shore"  manufacturing  centres  for  the  world  market, 
education  and  training of workers,  technicians  and 
managers  from  developing  countries, 
~~ turnkey projects.  These  are  complete  installations 
such  as  steel plants or  petrochemical  complexes  that 
enable Third  World  countries  to  process  raw 
materials locally, 
licencing  agreements  enabling  developing  countries 
to  use  manufacturing  processes  and  technology 
developed  by  private corporations  in  the  industrialised 
countries, 
management contracts  where  the  developing  country 
calls in expatriate specialists to  run  a  project 
until such  time  as  its nationals  have  acquired  the 
training  and  skills  to  manage  it themselves. 
Countries at an  early stage of  industrialisation generally 
rely more  heavily on direct  foreign  investment  by 
international corporations  (alone  or  in  association with 
local  joint venture  partners).  This  transfer  mechanism 
combines  in one  package  technology,  capital,  production 
skills, marketing  and  management.  Third  World  nations - 96  -
with  more  complex  and  developed  industrial structures 
are  better  able  to choose  the  kind  of  arrangements  best 
suited to  their  specific  needs  and  which  will dovetail 
with  those  aspects of  technology  and  human  skills 
already present within their borders.  This  unpackaged 
form  of  technology  transfer  has  increased over  time  as 
buyers  become  more  sophisticated  and  as  competition 
among  suppliers  and  therefore their  willingness  to meet 
the client's specific needs  has  intensified.  This  trend 
is  less marked  however,  in  high  technology  sectors where 
buyer  countries  lack  much  of  the  necessary  expertise  and 
suppliers are  relatively  few.  Nonetheless,  developing 
nations,  particularly those  with  a  large potential 
.domestic market,can  demand  that effective technology 
transfer  take place  by  setting  requirements  for  the 
incorporation of  local  components  and  materials  in  the 
product  being manufactured.  Sometimes,  they  try to 
make  these products  artificially competitive  by  giving 
them  massive  tariff  and  fiscal  protection against 
imports. 
Where  it originates  and  where  it goes 
Of  the different types of  transmission channels,  exports 
of capital goods  and  complete  industrial plants  showed 
the  strongest growth  during  the  past decade of  about 
10%  a  year  in  real  terms.  This  rise  has  flattened off 
as  a  result of  the  recession,  especially  in  the oil-
exporting countries whose  demand  helped  push  exports 
of capital equipments  to  the  Third  World  to over  40% 
of total exports of  these  goods  by  the  industrialised 
nations.  Capital goods  exports  to  the Third  World  have 
also  been  stimulated  by  generous  export  financing  and 
credit provided  by  the  supplier  country.  Payments  for 
licences  and  technical  and  commercial  services  have 
been  growing  at about  4%  a  year.  A similar  rhythm of 
expansion  has  been  recorded  for  foreign  direct  investment. - 97  -
The  major  suppliers of  technology  have  been  the 
United  States,  Germany  and  Japan  followed  by  Britain 
and  France.  Between  them,  they  account  for  about 
70%  of  the  total technology  transfer  from  the 
industrialised to  the  developing  countries.  The 
principal recipient areas  were  Latin  America,  Asia 
(where  Japan  is particularly active  as  a  foreign 
investor)  and  the  Middle  East.  Foreign  investments 
in particular can  be  analysed  on  a  regional  basis. 
Investments  in Latin  America  and  Africa  tend  to  be 
geared  to supplying  domestic or  regional markets, 
whereas  those  in Asian countries  see  a  larger  share 
of  their output  exported  to the  world  market or  the 
markets of industrialised countries.  This  is partly 
determined  by  the  industry where  the  investments  are 
made.  In  Latin America,  investments  have  centred  on 
heavy  and  basic  industries  aimed  at  import-substitution 
and  raw material processing,  whereas  investments  in 
Asian  exporting  countries were  initially in textiles 
and  light manufacturing  for  export. 
The  emergence  of  Third  World  technology 
In  recent years,  a  small  number  of  Third  World  countries 
such  as Brazil,  Taiwan,  South  Korea,  India,  Argentina 
and  Mexico  have  graduated  to  the  rank  of suppliers of 
technology.  Part of  their  success  is due  to  their 
ability to  absorb Northern  technologies  and  adapt  them 
to specific Third  World  conditions  and  requirements. 
They  are  also .able  to offer highly skilled  manpower  at 
relatively low costs.  This  group of countries can  now 
offer capital equipment,  turnkey plants,  engineering 
consultancy services,  etc  and  have  begun direct 
investments  in other developing  countries.  India has 
developed  the greatest  range of activities  including 
management  services  and  the  supply  and  construction 
of  turnkey  industrial plants.  It has  secured  in  the - 98  -
last  few  years contracts  for  more  than  150 complete 
industrial  comp~exes in Asia,  the  Middle  East  as 
well  as  North  and  East Africa.  Brazil  is  a  supplierof 
management  services  and  turnkey  plants,  notably 
(but  not only)  in  the  steel  sector,  while  the 
importance of  South  Korean  firms  in  the  Middle  East 
construction market  is well  known.  Such  technology 
exports  are still small  in  global  terms,  accounting 
for  only  2.6%  of world  exports of capital goods  in 
1981.  But  they  are  forerunners  of  significant  and 
growing  opportunities  for  trade  and  technological 
links  among  developing  countries. 
At  present,  the  mainstream of Third  World  industri-
alisation  remains  in  the  low  to  medium  technology 
sectors.  Textiles  and  clothing  (see  Table  II)  still 
account  for  nearly  30%  of  their  exports of manufactures, 
while  their  import  dependence  on  capital goods 
actually  increased  (from  53%  to  57%)  in  the  1973-1981 
period. 
TABLE  II 
TRADE  IN  MANUFACIURES  BEIWEEN  NON-QIL  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
AND  WESTERN  INDUSTRIALISED  NATIONS 
in billion US$ 
THIRD  \\URLD  THIRD  IDRLD 
EXPORTS  IMPORTS 
1973  %  1981  %  1973  %  1981  %  -- -- -- --
Tbtal Manufactures  15.1  100  62.0  100  40.15  100  151.0  100 
Capital goods  2.31  15.3  15.4  23.8  21.42  53.3  86.85  57.5 
Textiles & Clothing  5.33  35.3  17.8  28.7  2.86  7.1  6.95  4.6 
Source  GATT,  International Trade  1981/82. - 99  -
As  we  have  seen,  the  manufacturing  potential  of 
the  Third  World  is concentrated  in  a  small  number 
of countries  and  this concentration  is even  greater 
for  capital goods  than  for  other  manufactures. 
Five countries  - Brazil,  South  Korea, .Taiwan, 
Hong  Kong  and  Singapore  - account  for  48%  of all 
EEC  imports of manufactures  from  the  Third  World 
but  this  figure  rises to  63%  in  the capital 
goods  sector.  Table  III  shows  that Third  World 
manufactures  have  reached  significant market  penetration 
levels  in western  industrialised markets  only  in 
sectors  such  as  textiles,  clothing,  footwear  and 
electrical appliances. 
TABLE  III 
SHARE  OF  IMPORTS  FROM  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
IN  TOTAL  OECD  IMPORTS  OF  MANUFACTURES  (%) 
1970  1979 
Chemicals  4.5  4.1 
Iron & Steel  2.9  5.5 
Textiles  13.0  20.5 
Clothing  27.4  44.7 
Footwear,  leather goods  & furs  16.4  33.9 
Non-electrical machinery  0.8  2.9 
Electrical machinery  & appliances  5.3  17.2 
Boad  motor  vehicles  0.2  1.1 
Other  transport equipment  2.0  5.5 
Other manufactures  6.8  11.1 
ALL  Ml\NUFAC'ruRFS  5.3  10.1 
Source  North/South Technology Transfer -
The  Adjustments Ahead. 
OECD- Paris 1981. - 100  -
1he  growth  sectors of  the  1980's will  be  capital 
goods.  The  Third  World  still has  a  long  way  to go 
to meet  the challenge or  to meet  its target of 
supplying  25%  of world  manufactures  by  the  year  2000. 
This  had  risen  to  13%  by  1980  from  7%  ten  years earlier. 
For  instance machinery  firms  in developing  countries 
undertake little research  and  development  and  they  lacklocal 
facilities  such  as  long-term export credit  and  insurance 
and  access  to international marketing  information. 
Is  there  an  "appropriate"  Third  World  technology  ? 
Third  World  industrialisation is,  as  we  have  seen, 
lopsided.  It has  benefitted essentially a  small  group 
of  relatively well  endowed  countries  - in  terms  of  human 
skills or  revenue-generating  raw  materials  - and  has 
been  concentrated  on  industrial consumer  goods  rather 
than  on  capital equipment.  Although  a  group of  second 
generation NIC's  have  also climbed  onto  the  industri-
alisation ladder  their  progress  is going .to  be  more 
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difficult than  that of  their  predecessors. 
Industrialisation has still  scarcely  started  in  a  large 
number  of  the poorest developing  countries. 
One  of  the  problems  raised  by  development  experts  is 
that of  the  "appropriate"technology  for  the  Third  World. 
Often  the  industrial  processes designed  and  developed 
in  the  rich countries  are  too capital-intensive  for 
developing  nations.  Their  adoption  by  poorer  countries 
can  aggravate  unemployment  and  underemployment. 
It is  argued  by  many  that  more  appropriate  technologies 
should  be  developed  that  take  account  of  the  relatively 
low cost of skilled  and  semi-skilled  labour.  As  it is, 
the competitiveness of  such  Third  World  technology  as 
exists  is  based  on  a  process of  learning  and  adapting 
techniques  imported  from  industrialised countries  and 
rendering  them  more  suitable to Third  World  conditions. - 101  -
Other  development strategists argue  that developing 
countries  should  try to  acquire  the  most  advanced 
technology available,  even  if it means  depending  on 
direct  investments  by multinational corporations  and 
expatriate management  skills  in  the  short  term. 
They  consider  that  a-technology  "appropriate"  to  the 
underdeveloped  countries  would  be  an  underdeveloped 
technology,  in other  words,  one  which  perpetuates  the 
gap  between  them and  the  industrialised countries 
and  which  should  therefore  be  avoided. 
This  school  seems  to beg  such  fundamental  questions  as 
whether  the developing  countries are  likely,  even  by 
using  the  most  advanced  technologies,  to  reach  the 
level of  industrialisation of  the  advanced  western 
nations  in  the  foreseeable  future,  or  more  basic 
still, whether  these countries  actually want  to  become 
latter-day Americas  or  Germanies. - 102  -
FINANCE,  DEBT  AND  AID 
NOWHERE  IS  THE  DEVELOPMENT  CRISIS  REFERRED  TO  IN 
CHAPTER  II MORE  EVIDENT  THAN  IN  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  THIRD 
WORLD  FINANCE.  ALL  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES,  SAVE  THE 
HANDFUL  OF  RICH  ARAB  OIL  EXPORTERS,  NEED  TO  SUPPLEMENT 
THEIR  INTERNAL  RESOURCES  THROUGH  EXTERNAL  SUPPORT  IF 
SOUND  GROWTH  IS  TO  BE  ATTAINED.  BUT  ALL  THE  MAJOR 
SOURCES  OF  FOREIGN  FINANCING  HAVE  STOPPED  GROWING. 
IN  A NUMBER  OF  CASES  THEY  ARE  ACTUALLY  FALLING  BACK  IN 
REAL  TERMS.  IF  WE  CONSIDER  THE  THREE  PRINCIPAL  SOURCES  -
EARNINGS  FROM  EXPORTS,  COMMERCIAL  LOANS  FROM  BANKS  AND 
OFFICIAL  AID  - IT  IS  EASY  TO  SEE  WHY.  IT  IS  ON  THE 
OTHER  HAND  MUCH  MORE  DIFFICULT  TO  SEE  HOW  THESE 
PROBLEMS  ARE  TO  BE  OVERCOME. 
EARNINGS  FROM  EXPORTS  BY  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  HAVE 
FALLEN  FOR  SEVERAL  REASONS.  THE  BIGGEST  SINGLE  FACTOR 
IS  THE  WORLDWIDE  RECESSION,ESPECIALLY  ITS  IMPACT  ON  THE 
INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES.  THEIR  DEMAND  FOR  IMPORTS  HAS 
FALLEN  OR  IN  SOME  CASES  BEEN  HELD  DOWN 
ARTIFICIALLY.  AS  GLOBAL  DEMAND  FOR  OIL 
REMAINS  DEPRESSED,  SURPLUS  OIL  EXPORTING  COUNTRIES, 
RELATIVELY  RECESSION-PROOF  UNTIL  1981,  ARE  NOW  ALSO 
CUTTING  BACK  ON  IMPORTS.  ASSOCIATED  WITH  THE  RECESSION, 
P~ICES FOR  THIRD  WORLD  EXPORTS  OF  PRIMARY  PRODUCTS  HAVE 
FALLEN. 
THE  DEBT  CRISIS  OF  A NUMBER  OF  THIRD  WORLD  COUNTRIES, 
PARTICULARLY  THE  NIC's,  HAS  BROUGHT  LENDING  BY  COMMERCIAL 
BANKS  TO  A WATERSHED.  DURING  THE  PAST  DECADE,  PARTLY  AS 
A CONSEQUENCE  OF  RECYCLING  MASSIVE  OPEC  SURPLUSES,  BANKS 
OVERLENT  AND  WILLING  THIRD  WORLD  COUNTRIES  OVERBORROWED. 
IT  TOOK  THE  NEAR  BANKRUPTING  OF  MEXICO,  ARGENTINA  AND 
BRAZIL  TO  BRING  HOME  TO  BANKS  THE  NEED  TO  RESPECT  SOUND 
PRUDENTIAL  LIMITS. - 103  -
BECAUSE  OF  THE  RECESSION,  BUT  ALSO  PARTLY  BECAUSE  OF 
A CERTAIN  UNEASE  AS  TO  HOW  THEIR  MONEY  WAS  BEING  USED, 
INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES  ARE  NO  LONGER  INCREASING  THEIR 
OFFICIAL  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE  (ODA)  TO  THE  THIRD  WORLD. 
OFFICIAL  AID  IS  PARTICULARLY  IMPORTANT  FOR  THE  POOREST 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  WHOSE  LOW  DEGREE  OF  CREDITWORTHINESS 
EXCLUDES  THEM  FROM  ACCESS  TO  COMMERCIAL  FINANCING. 
ODA  FROM  THE  OECD  COUNTRIES  FELL  TO  25.5  BILLION  DOLLARS 
IN  1981  FROM  27.3  BILLION  IN  1980.  IT  IS  UNLIKELY  TO  GROW 
IN  REAL  TERMS  IN  THE  FORESEEABLE  FUTURE. 
WAYS  DO  EXtST  TO  REMEDY  THE  PRESENT  SITUATION. 
THE  DEBTS  OF  NIC
1S  AND  MIDDLE  INCOME 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  TO  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  SHOULD  BE 
RESCHEDULED  (IN  OTHER  WORDS,  REPAYMENT  SHOULD  BE 
POSTPONED),  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  THEMSELVES  SHOULD 
APPLY  CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  ECONOMIC  POLICIES,  NEW  CREDITS 
SHOULD  BE  MADE  AVAILABLE  TO  PREVENT  SEVERE  DEFLATION  IN 
THE  THIRD  WORLD  AND/OR  THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  WORLD  BANKING 
SYSTEM,  AND  FINALLY  INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES  SHOULD  MAKE 
AN  EFFORT  TO  INCREASE  THEIR  OFFICIAL  AID  AGAIN,  ESPECIALLY 
IN  FAVOUR  OF  THE  LEAST  DEVELOPED  NATIONS. 
THE  REAL  QUESTION  IS  WHETHER  THE  REMEDIES  CAN  BE  ADMINISTRED 
OVER  THE  SHORT  AND  MEDIUM  TERM  FUTURE. - 104  -
How  Third  World  Capital  needs  are  met 
The  capital requirements of the Third World  to finance its 
development  are enormous.  Developing  countries'own internal 
resources  and  the  external  revenues  generated  by  their 
exports  are totally  inadequate.  In  addition,  an 
I 
increasing  share of  their  export earnings  are  having 
to  be  used  to  pay  for  dearer oil  imports  without 
serving  any  additional  economic  function.  External 
sources of capital  have  therefore  played  and  will 
continue  to play  a  key  role  in Third  World  financing, 
but  they  are  subject  to more  and  more  constraints. 
While  net North-South  financial  flows  have  increased 
from  12.8 billion dollars  in  1970  to  110.4  billion  in 
1982,  the  rate of  increase  has  slowed  considerably  in 
recent years.  According  to projections  from  the 
World  Bank  (see  Table  I),  the  growth  in capital  flows 
during  the  1980's,  even  under  favourable  conditions, 
will  be  less  than one-third of  the  rate  achieved  during 
the  1970-80 period.  Under less favourable  conditions 
(the  low-case scenario),  there will  in  fact  be  virtually 
no  growth  at all  in  real  terms. 
TABLE  I 
NET  FINANCING  F'I.CMS,  ALL  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES,  1970-90 
(billions of current dollars) 
Projected,  1990 
Net  financing  ·--
1970  1980  1981  1982  IJ:Jw  case  High  case 
Official transfers  1.2  12.1  12.8  13.6  28.3  32.7 
Private direct investment  2.5  11 .8  15.3  15.8  19.4  24.4 
Medium- and  long-term loans, 
net disbursements  9. 1  57.3  71.4  81.0  99.2  151.1 
Official  - 4. 1  20.4  23.4  25.0  44.0  54.9 
Oommercial  banks  5.0  36.9  48.0  56.0  55.2  96.7 
Total  12.8  81.2  99.5  110.4  146.9  208.2 
Total  ( 1980  prices)  32.7  81.2  89.5  102.5  82.1  116.3 
Source  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report,  1982. - 105  -
Not  only have  overall  financial  flows  been  expanding 
less fast;  their  nature  has  also changed  markedly. 
Concessional  flows  in  the  form  of grants  and  soft loans 
have  fallen  in percentage  terms  while  the  proportion 
of capital  flows  at  (considerably stricter)  market 
conditions  has  increased  significantly.  Table  I  shows 
that while official loans  and  transfers  have 
risen  by  15%  since  1980,  commercial  bank 
lending  to-developing  countries has  expanded  by  55%. 
Private direct  investment,  which  rose  fourfold  during 
the  1970's will,  at best,  increase  at  half  this  rate 
during  the current decade. 
Over  the past  10  years or  so,  there  has  been  a  clear 
differentiation between  the  kinds  of capital  flows 
going  to  the  NIC's  and  the  middle  income  developing 
countries on  the  one  hand  and  the  poorest Third  World 
nations on  the  other.  The  latter group have  been 
unable  to attract private  investments or  loans  on 
commercially  acceptable  risk  terms.  They  have  there-
fore  come  to depend  to  a  large extent on official 
development  assistance.  In  fact,  55%  of  ODA  from  the 
OECD  countries  in  1981  went  to  the  least developed 
countries  and  other  low-income  developing  nations. 
A further  43%  went  to middle-income  countries  and 
only  2%  to  the NIC's. 
The  NIC's  and  the middle-income  countries  have  come  to 
rely excessively on  non-concessional  financial  flows. 
They  were  able  to maintain  above-average  growth  rates 
during  the  1970's principally because  they could 
finance  their development  by  massive credits at market 
conditions  from  commercial  banks.  At  end-1981,  60% 
of debt  owed  to commercial  banks  by  Third  World 
countries  was  accounted  for  by  10  NIC's  and  middle 
income  countries.  Low  income  countries  as  a  whole 
accounted  for  17%  of outstanding debt,  while within 
this group  the  least developed  nations  were  responsible - 106  -
for  only  3%  of Third  World  commercial  debt. 
But  irrespective of  the different methods  of 
external  financing,  all the  developing  nations  -
NIC's  and  LLDC's  alike  - are  finding  that  the  flow 
of  fwrls is slowing  up.  Heavily  indebted  countries 
are  finding  commercial  banks  reluctant  to  advance 
them  further  credits.  Many  banks,  in  the  wake  of 
the debt crises of  a  number  of developing  countries, 
realise they  have  overcommitted  themselves  in granting 
credits to these nations.  The  poorest developing 
countries  ~re also  feeling  the  pinch  as  industrialised 
aid donors,  hit by  the  recession,  reduce  the  rate at 
which  their  aid  is growing.  To  a  certain extent,  they 
are  turning  away  from  the  poorest countries.  They 
are  increasingly  tempted  to  link  what  aid  resources 
they  have  to  their  own  export  interests  by  using  ODA 
as  an  additional  inducement  to  a  Third  World  country 
to which  it is  trying  to sell capital goods.  Such 
recipients  tend  to  be  larger middle-income  countries 
with  a  greater capacity for  absorbing  imports of 
western capital goods  than  the  poorest nations. 
Export  earnings decline 
Before  looking  more  closely at  the difficulties for 
the  Third  World  caused  by  the  drying  up  of credits 
or  the  slow-down  in official aid,  it is  necessary 
to examine  an  equally crucial  aspect of  the  financial 
difficulties of  the  developing  countries - the  fall 
in their  export earnings. 
The  fall  in  revenues  accruing  to developing countries 
because  they can  no  longer  expand  exports  as  before 
is  important  in  itself as  well  as  for  the  bearing it 
has  on  the  problems  of debt  and  aid.  The  less 
developing  countries  earn directly  from  exports,  the 
more  they have  to  rely on  other external sources of - 107  -
financing.  Their  export growth  has  been decelerating 
at  a  sharp pace  in  recent  years.  According  to  the 
IMF,  real export growth  of  the  non-oil developing 
countries fell  from  an  annual  rate of  9-10%  in  1978 
to  5-6%  in  1980  and  3%  in  1982.  There  is little 
liklihood of this rate picking  up  again  as  long  as 
the  recession  in  their major  markets,  particularly 
those of  the  industrialised countries,  persists. 
Because of  the drop  in  demand  for  their products, 
coupled  with  protectionism by  industrialised countries, 
and  the combined  effect of dearer oil and  falling 
prices  for  their own  primary products,  the  overall 
trade deficit of  the  developing countries which  stood 
at less  than  nine  billion dollars  in  1970  had  risen 
to  59  billion in  1980  and  89  billion  in  1981. 
There  are  few  bright  spots  in  this  sombre  picture. 
The  recession has  now  hit the  surplus oil exporting 
countries who  have  begun  the cut  back  on  imports  in 
line with other  markets  for  developing  countries' 
exports.  Since  the  1979-80  boom,  prices  for  non-oil 
primary products  sold  by  the  Third  World  have  fallen 
by  an  average of  about  30%.  In  1982,  they  reached 
~he lowest  level  in  more  than  25  years  relative  to 
the price of manufactured  imports.  The  net  result 
of all these  trends  has  been  to  throw  developing 
countries  back  on  loans  and  aid  to  finance  their 
deficits.  Already  many  of  them  have  taken  action  to 
cut  back  imports.  While  this  may  reduce  their 
deficits,  it also cuts global  demand  for  exports, 
thereby contributing  to deepening  the  recession  even 
more.  This  pressure,on external sources of  financing 
has  come  on  top of  "normal"  demands  for  development 
finance  in  the past  few  years. - 108  -
Third  World  Debt 
Thanks  to  an  attitude of  benign neglect on  the part 
of  the  industrialised countries  and  one of active 
encouragement  by  their  commercial  bankers,  Third 
World  indebtedness  has  been  allowed  to  reach 
disturbing  proportions.  It represents  a  long  term 
mortgage  f.or  the  future  growth  of  the developing 
countries  and  a  dangerous  risk  for  the  worldwide 
banking  system.  The  total outstanding  developing 
countries'  debt  is given  in  Table  II.  In  some  cases, 
annual  debt  servicing  - interest charges  and  the 
repayment of principle  as it falls due  - absorb  the 
vast  bulk  of  a  country's  export earnings.  About 
60%  of  the  total debt  is  owed  to commercial  banks 
and  other private sources of credit. 
TABLE  II 
'niiRD  ~RLD  DEBT  1971-1982 
(In  billions of  Dollars) 
1971  1975  1980  1981  1982 
Total Debt  70  180  465  530  626 
Annual  Debt  servicing  11  25  87  109  131 
Source  :  COCO,  External Debt  of Developing  Countries 
(December  1982). 
And  yet until  1980,  the  international capital market, 
the  so-called Eurocurrency market,  was  a  borrowers' 
market.  International  banks  were  inundated  with 
funds,  largely as  a  result of  the  first oil shock 
of  1973-74.  Banks  found  insufficient clients  for 
their deposits  among  the  recession-hit  economies  of 
the  industrialised world.  In  consequence,  they 
actively wooed  capital -hungry NIC's  and  middle-
income  countries with  mounting  oil bills to  borrow 
from  them.  Governments  in  the  industrialised 
countries  and  the  international monetary  authorities - 109  -
were  only  too  happy  to see  the  marketplace  assume 
the strain of  the  recycling  process  with  only 
minimal  interference  on  their part. 
Since  1980,  the  situation has  changed  radically. 
There are  a  number  of  reasons  for  this  in  addition 
to  the  obvious  one  that many  developing countries 
had  borrowed  to their  limits.  These  include  : 
the  persistence of  the  recession  that  followed 
the  1979-80 oil price rises.  The  world  economic 
slowdown  has  been  deeper  and  more  lasting  than 
expected.  Low  growth  in  the  world  economy  will 
restrict the  exports of developing  countries  and 
therefore  impair  their debt-servicing capacities. 
In many  cases, credits were  given before the recession set 
in or  on  the  assumption  that it would  be 
short-lived,  like  the one  that  followed  the  first 
oil shock. 
the  high  level of  interest rates.  These  are 
determined  by  the  industrialised countries, 
particularly the  United  States.  American  monetary 
policy pushed  up  interest rates,  radically 
affecting  the  amount  of debt  a  borrowing country 
can  afford  to  incur.  Although  these  have  declined 
somewhat  since mid-1982,  they  are still high  in 
real  terms,  since  the  downturn  in  interest rates 
has  been paralLeled  by  a  fall  in  inflation levels. 
In  addition,  Third  World  borrowers  have  had  to 
pay  a  higher  "premium"  in  terms  of  a  higher 
interest rate on  new  loans  because of  the greater 
risks  stemming  from  their  already  high  debt  level. 
the  increase  in  the  proportion of short  term debt. 
Because of current  high  rates of  interest,  some 
Third  World  countries  have  preferred  to  borrow 
short-term.  This desire has  been  matched  by  one 
by  banks  not  to commit  long-term  funds  to  borrowers 
whose  long-term prospects  are  not  bright. - 110  -
Average maturities  for  credits to developing 
countries have  fallen  to one-to-four  years  from 
seven years previously.  Table  III  shows  that 
at end-1981  the  major  borrowing  countries  had 
a  large proportion of  their  debt  falling  due  in 
one  year  or  less. 
TABLE  III 
DEBT  <MED  'ID  BANKS  AT  END-1981 
Total  % of  % of 
$  billions  total  1982 
=J\.  :s 
Mexico  56.9  49  85 
Brazil  52.7  35  67 
Venezuela  26.2  61  79 
Argentina  24.8  47  100 
South  Korea  19.9  58  37 
Chile  10.5  40  78 
Philippines  10.2  56  63 
Indonesia  7.2  .41  14 
Taiwan  6.6  62  14 
Nigeria  6.0  34  12 
Colombia  5.4  49  53 
'Ihailand  5.1  60  29 
Malaysia  4.4  31  10 
Peru  4.4  60  62 
Turkey  4.2  25  10 
Source  r-Drgan  Guaranty,  Vbrld  Financial Markets, 
August  1982. 
oil price developments.  The  second oil price 
increase of  1979-80 affected  in significant fashion 
the external payments  position of  many  non-oil 
developing countries.  While  the  subsequent 
weakening  of oil prices  has  provided  some  relief, 
it has  posed  serious  problems  for  oil exporting 
countries  such  as  Mexico  and  Nigeria. - 111  -
earlier credits were  utilised badly  by  some 
recipient countries.  Instead of  being  invested 
to boost  productive capacities or  to facilitate 
economic  adjustment  processes,  borrowing  was 
often used  to sustain consumption.  Banks  were 
once  bitten,  twice  shy.  They  were  reluctant  to 
renew  such credits when  they matured,  without 
at least  a  considerable  hardening of  the  terms. 
The  geographic  breakdown  of Third  World  debt 
and  its evolution  since  the  1973  oil price rises 
are given  in  Table  IV. 
TABLE  IV 
NON-GIL  DE.VELOPING  COUNTRIES  : 
lONG-TERM  EXTERNAL  DEBT,  1973-81 
(In billions of Dollars) 
1973  1975  1977  1979  1981 
Tbtal outstanding debt of non-oil 
developing  countries  96.8  146.8  221.8  324.4  436.9 
By area 
Africa  13.1  19.9  31.7  44.7  56.0 
Asia  27.0  36.7  53.0  71.6  102.8 
Europe  11.6  16.2  25.4  44.0  60.2 
Middle  East  8.5  13.1  20.3  28.3  36.7 
western Hemisphere  36.6  60.9  91.4  135.8  181.2 
Source  :  IMF,  Annual  RefX?rt,  1982. 
As  a  result of  the  debt crisis of  a  few  developing 
countries  - in particular Mexico,  Brazil  and  Argentina  -
the  perception of  the  risks  in  lending  to all 
developing  countries  has  been  heightened.  Although 
the debt problems  of  African countries  such  as  Zaire 
and  Sudan  are  small  in  comparison  they  are  just as 
important  in relative  terms.  Borrowing,  even  if the 
world  economy  were  to  recover  in  the  near  term,  would 
not  be  as  easy  as  before.  Higher  risk  premiums  will - 112  -
be  required,  especially  from  those  countries  that 
are  similarly situated  - economically,  politically 
and  even  geographically  - as  those  in difficulty. 
In  short,  the debt option of  economic  development 
will  be  restricted  to  fewer  developing  countries, 
principally  in  South  East Asia. 
Official Development  Assistance 
As  has  been  seen,  official development  aid  by 
governments  is  a  vital source of  financing  for  the 
poorest developing  countries.  According  to World  Bank 
estimates,  about  40  countries will continue  to  rely 
almost  entirely on official development  assistance 
during  the  1980's  to  supplement  domestic  resources 
for  physical  and  human  development.  Most  of  these 
countries  are  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  Bank 
believes  another  SO  developing  countries could  reduce 
their  dependence  on  ODA  provided  they  adopt  appropriate 
policies to foster  self-sustaining  growth,  replace 
official aid  with  non-concessional  assistance  and  meet 
their debt-service obligations. 
The  chances of official aid  growing  enough  to  increase 
its effectiveness,  especially  in  the  least developed 
nations  are  not especially good.  At  most,  aid  from 
OECD  countries  is expected  to  remain  around  present 
levels  for  the  next  three years.(see Table  V). 
Several  members  among  the  majority who  have  not yet 
done  so are committed  to  reaching  the  United  Nations 
target of giv.ing  o.  7%  of  GNP  in  aid  in  1990. 
Besides  the  OECD  countries,  the  members  of  OPEC  are 
the other  main official aid  donors.  Their  share  of 
aid  has  been  much  higher  in  relation to  GNP  than  that 
of  the western  industrialised countries.  They  are 
expected  to maintain  relatively high  levels of  aid 
in  the  future despite  an  expected  reduction  in  the 
size of their  payments  surplus. ---------------------------------~-- ---------
TABLE  V 
"  OF GNP 
ODA  AS  PERCENTAGE  OF  GNP  1970  - 1981 
'IDI'AL  OOCD  DE.VELOPMENI'  ASSISTANCE  CXMU'!TE  (DAC) 
:::==r-1 ~~  'J-------r-1 ---,1---r-1 ---.,--.-,  --.-,  -----r-1-~ 
0.32 
0.31 
0.30 
0.29 
0.28 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
Source  :  OEX:D  Chserver N°117  (July 1982). 
1981 
....  .... 
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The. Arab  members  account  for  97%  of  OPEC  aid. 
Their  1981  aid  as  a  percentage of  GNP  totals  2.80  %. 
Figures  for  individual  OECD  countries,  including 
European  Community  members,  as  well  as  comparative 
figures  for  OPEC  and  Comecon  countries  are given  in 
Table  VI.  The  Soviet  Union  and  its East  European 
partners are small  providers of development  aid. 
TABLE  VI 
OECD  MEMBERS  OFFICIAL  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE  1981 
ODA  net disbursements  Grant 
element of 
$  m.  % of  % ofDAC  ODA  corrunit-
GNP  total  ments  (%) 
Australia  649  0.41  2.5  100.0 
Austria  314  0.48  1. 2  55.1 
Belgium  575  0.59  2.2  97.7 
Canada  1189  0.43  4.6  97.3 
Denmark  403  o. 73  1. 6  95.6 
Finlarrl  135  0.28  0.5  95.6 
France  4177  0.73  16.3  89.6 
Germany  3181  0.47  12.4  85.9 
Italy  665  0.19  2.6  91.3 
Japan  3171  0.28  12.4  75.6 
Netherlarrls  1510  1.08  5.9  95.2 
New  Zealand  68  0.29  0.3  100.0 
Norway  467  0.82  1.8  100.0 
Sweden  916  0.83  3.6  99.9 
Switzerland  237  0.24  0.9  97 .o 
United Kingdom  2195  0.44  8.6  96.8 
United States  5783  0.20  22.6  94.0 
'IDI'AL  OEX:D  25635  0.35  100.0  90.0 
'IDI'AL  OPE:  7836  1.46  - -
CXMEXXN  2129  0.14  - -
.. 
Source  OEX:D,  Developnent Cooperation  (1982  Review). - 115  -
The  biggest part of  ODA.  31%. goes  on  health, 
education  and  other  services,  while  16%  is devoted 
to  agricultural projects,  8%  to  energy  and  7%  to 
industry  and  commerce.  The  volume  of  aid  received 
by  the  least developed  countries,  because  they 
receive little from  other  sources,  largely 
determines  their  level of  imports,  their  investments 
and  indirectly their  growth  levels.  This  is  why 
the  poorest countries  stand  to .suffer  most  from  the 
present  tendency  among  donor  countries  to ease  up 
on  their  aid effort.  OECD  members  aid  to  the  least 
developed  countries  is  still only  0.075%  of  GNP;  many  of 
them  pledged at  the  1981  Paris conference  on  the 
problems  of  the  LLDC's  todouble  this proportion  to 
0.15%. 
Pointers  to  the  future 
The  key  to overcoming  the current obstacles  in 
providing  adequate  financing  for  Third  World 
development  is  the extent' to  which  the  world  economy 
will  recover  during  the  present decade.  But  even 
if the  recovery  is  slow or  partial,  there  are  a 
number  of  flanking  measures  which  need  to  be  taken. 
One  of  the  most central of  these  is  to  avoid  actions 
that will  force  the  Third  World,  and  with  it the 
global economy 1  on  a  further  deflationary spiral 
through  the  large-scale reduction of credits or 
inadequate public  aid  flows. 
Already  the International Monetary  Fund  is playing 
a  leading  role  in edging  the  biggest debtor  countries 
back  from  the  brink of  bankruptcy.  Most  countries, 
developing  or  developed,  dislike going  to  the  IMF  for 
help because of the conditions  attached  to its loans, 
which  require  recepient governments  to  apply strict 
economic  recovery  programmes  under  IMF  surveillance. 
However,  a  number  of developing  countries  now  have - 116  -
no  alternative  but  to go  to the  Fund  as  the  lender 
of  last resort  and  accept  its loan conditions. 
At  the  ~nd of  1982,  more  than  30  developing 
countries were  using  Fund  resources  in  support of 
tough  programmes  to  overcome  acute  balance of 
payments  problems.  The  IMF  has  taken  the  lead  in 
organising  rescue operations  for  major  debtors 
like Mexico,  and  it insists that commercial  banks, 
who  bear  their  share of responsibility for  what 
has  happened,  participate with  it in  these 
operations. 
The  calls being  made  on  the  Fund  has  given  urgency 
to  the  need  to  increase  its resources  from  its 
present quota  total of  65  billion dollars. 
Mincrease of about  50%  of quotas  was  expected  to 
be  approved  in  1983  for  implementation  in  1984. 
However,  the  role of  the  Fund  should  not  replace 
that of ·commercial  banks  in  rescheduling Third  World 
debts  and  maintaining  the  necessary level of credits 
to  those  countries.  Nor  should  borrower  governments 
await  the  moment  where  they  have  to  appeal  for  IMF 
support  before  implementing  the  necessary  economic 
policies that will cut external deficits,  speed 
internal  adjustment,  stimulate self-sustaining 
growth  :  in short,  apply  the  type  of confidence-building 
policies that will maintain  their  access  to external 
sources of  financing,  be  they  in  the  form  of credits 
or direct  investments.  Already  there  are  signs  that 
some  developing  nations  who  had  not  encouraged  private 
investment  in  the  past  are  now  making  particular 
efforts in this direction. 
Individual donor  countries will  also have  to try to 
maintain official aid  levels,  despite  the  impact of 
the  recession.  "Their  help  is vital for  the  poorest 
countries  in that it helps to provide  them  with  the 
basic  tools  for  growth  in  terms  of education, - 117-
infrastructure,  agricultural production.  In 
recessions,  donor  governments  are  under  pressure 
to  cut. back  further  on  development  aid  in  favour 
of  domestic priorities or  are  tempted  to  use  it 
more  specifically as  an  instrument  of  economic 
diplomacy,  in order  to obtain  the  highest  return. 
To  neglect  the poorest countries of  the  world  in 
this way  would  be  to  condemn  them  to  dropping 
even  further  behind  the  rest of  the  Third  World 
than  they  are  already. - 118  -
G  L  0  S  S  A  R  Y 
A 
A.C.P.  (63)  :  (African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific States)  : 
Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Benin, 
Botswana,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde,  Central 
African  Republic,  Chad,  Comoros,  Congo,  Djibouti,  . 
Dominica,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia;  Fiji,  Gabon, 
Gambia,  Ghana,  Grenada,  Guinea,  Guinea  Bissau,  Guyana, 
Ivory Coast,  Jamaica,  Kenya,  Kiribati,  Lesotho,  Liberia, 
Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Mauritius,  Niger, 
Nigeria,  Papua-New  Guinea,  Rwanda,  St  Lucia,  St  Vincent 
and  Grenadines,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Senegal, 
Seychelles,  Sierra Leone,  Salomon  Islands,  Somalia, 
. Sudan,  Surinam,  Swaziland,  Tanzania,  Togo,  Tonga, 
Trinidad  & Tobago,  Tuvalu,  Uganda,  Upper  Volta,  Vanuatu, 
Western  Samoa,  Zaire,  Zambia,  Zimbabwe. 
ARAB  LEAGUE  : 
Morocco,  Algeria,  Tunisia,  Libya,  (Egypt),  Sudan, 
Mauritania,  Somalia,  Lebanon,  Syria,  Iraq,  Jordan,  Saudi 
Arabia,  Kuwait,  Bahrain,  Qatar,  United  Arab  Emirates, 
Omar,  North  Yemen,  South  Yemen,  PLO. 
ASEAN  :  (The  Association of  South-East  Asian  Nations)  : 
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Thailand  and  Singapore. 
B 
BILLION  : 
One  thousand million. - 119  -
c 
COMECON  or  CMEA  :  (Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance) 
Members  are  the  Soviet  Union,  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia, 
German  Democratic  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Rumania  and 
Mongolia.  Comecon  countries  (less  Mongolia)  are  sometimes 
referred  to as  the  non-market  industrialised countries. 
D 
D.A.C.  :  (Development  Assistance  Committee  of  the  OECD) 
Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Federal 
Republic  of Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  New 
Zealand,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  USA. 
E 
E.E.C.  :  European  Economic  Community. 
E.F.T.A.  :  European  Free  Trade  Association. 
E.I.B.  European  Investment  Bank. 
E.C.u.  European  Currency  Unit. 
EUROSTAT  :  Statistical Office of  European  Communities. 
F 
F.A.O.  Food  and  Agricultural Organisation. 
G 
G.A.T.T.  :  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
The  object of this agreement,  signed  in  1947,  is to 
reduce  barriers to  international trade. - 120  -
G.N.P.  :  Gross  National  Product. 
GROUP  OF  77  :  Group  of  Developing  Countries 
established at the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development.  This  group,  which  often acts  as  a 
spokesman  for  the  Third  World,  originally had  77  members 
and  now  has  115. 
G.S.P.  :  Generalised  System of  Preferences  :  This  is 
the  system of preferential tariffs applied  by 
industrialised countries  to  manufactured  imports  from 
LDC's.  The  tariff reductions  are  accompagnied  by 
quotas  for  some  products  but  apply without quantitative 
restrictions  for  others. 
I 
I.D.A. 
I.M.F. 
L 
International  Development  Association  (World  Bank). 
International Monetary  Fund. 
L.L.D.C.'s  Least  Developed  Countries. 
N 
N.I.C.'s:  Newly  Industrialising Countries.  There  is 
no  set list of  these countries.  For  the  purposes  of 
this  present document,  these  include  Brazil,  Taiwan, 
South  Korea,  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore. 
0 
O.D.A.  Official  Development  Assistance. - 121  -
O.E.C.D.  :  (Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development)  :  Member  countries  : 
E.E.C.  :  Belgium,  Denmark,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
France,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  United 
Kingdom.  E.F.T.A  :  Austria,  Finland,  Iceland,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Sweden,  Switzerland.  Others  :  Australia, 
Canada,  Greece,  Japan,  New  Zealand,  Spain,  Turkey,  USA. 
O.P.E.C.  :  (Organisation of  Petroleum Exporting  Countries) 
Member  countries  : 
Algeria,  Ecuador,  Gabon,  Indonesia,  Iraq,  Iran,  Kuwait, 
Libya,  Nigeria,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  United  Arab  Emirates, 
Venezuela. 
s 
STABEX  :  This  is the  scheme  for  stabilising export 
earnings  applied  by  the  E.E.C.  to  its A.C.P.  partners 
in  the  Lome  Convention.  It offsets losses  in  revenue 
suffered  by  ACP  countries on  their  exports  of  primary 
products,  acting  as  a  kind  of  insurance  policy against 
bad  years. 
u 
UNCTAD  :  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development. - 122  -
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